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REPORTAGE ON INSTALLED ELECTRIC GENERATION CAPACITY

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 29 Oct 82 No 44 pp 28-31

[Article by Raul Lazo; "Emulation--Seeking Solutions: The Great Leap Forward"]

[Text] The title of this report speaks of advances, but the complaint about iron with defects is heard repeatedly. A request for arbitration has been filed, but due to some peculiarities of the contractual mechanism, in the opinion of the plaintiff, the best results have not been achieved. The reporter will investigate this situation and visit the centers about which complaints have been made. What will be the outcome?

At the time of the triumph of the Revolution, Cuba's electricity generating capacity was 397.1 MW. In 1980, the installed power of the MINBAS [Ministry of Basic Industries], which that year generated 87.7 percent of the total amount of electricity produced in Cuba, came to 2,152 MW, which is 4.4 times the 1958 capacity.

Between 1959 and 1978 48 generating plants with a total value of 460.2 million pesos had been built or were then in the process of construction. Of these, 28 were thermal plants valued at 432.1 million pesos.

The average annual rate of increase during these 22 years was 7.5 percent. From 1959 to 1965 it was only 4.8 percent; from 1976 to 1980 it rose to 9.6 percent.

The increases in the installed power capacity require an expansion in the maintenance and repair capacity for these complex pieces of equipment and machinery.

Given the snowballing effect of electricity on other sectors and areas of the economy, the efficiency of maintenance and repair has endless repercussions all over the country.

We hardly need dwell any further on this topic before pointing out the importance of the Emilio Ayala Molina national mechanical workshop, belonging to the Electric Power Plants Maintenance Unit of the MINBAS.

The Great Leap Forward

The completion of the Emilio Ayala Molina plan can be termed a great leap forward, when it is compared with the same period of the preceding year, what had been planned at that date, and with this year's program.

Other indicators, such as productivity, are also positive: with a plan of 5,093 pesos per worker, until August there was a real productivity rate of 6,666 pesos, meaning a compliance rate of 131 percent. The salary/productivity correlation had been set for 36 centavos per peso, while the actual correlation is 28 centavos.

We do have one doubt. Are these increments due to an increase in labor efficiency?

Reinaldo Pinero Luzardo, the shop administrator, answered us:

"The 'leap forward' is essentially due to new products that have a higher value in relation to products made in preceding years."

What are these products? we asked Reinaldo, who answered: "The plates for tubular air heaters, which used to be received in packages, already made, which were just sent to our shop to be drilled; the increase in the repairs of rotors, which have now reached the number of 15, either delivered or in the process of repair; the production of water tanks, being made here for the first time; and the production of pipe diaphragms."

"The amount of work planned for each machine tool has helped us to improve the use of the equipment," added the shop administrator.

Could this increase in production have come earlier? We don't know, but the apparently "simple" reorientation of the shop toward higher value products than its earlier products suggests an improved use of resources and equipment.

"We have managed to keep our most highly skilled specialists and workers on more complex production jobs, which means that we can balance out the costs of the skilled labor force that had been used on simpler jobs. All of this means an increased

use of the technical, material, and human resources," added Jose Gonzalez Trabazo, the technical director of production.

This is not true just inside the shop. Work done in other enterprises makes up 7 percent of the value of the plan. This indicates the level of cooperation between enterprises, which is still too limited in Cuba.

Nine of the rotors that have been repaired this year belong to the sugar ministry. The Emilio Ayala Molina shop also produces rubber parts for the automobile industry and for the ministry of public health.

A Current Slogan and Foreign Currency

This is much more than a simple play on words. In this shop the search for solutions has become transformed into a slogan that has saved the nation thousands and thousands of pesos in convertible currency, thus in foreign currency.

We should mention the development of mechanization and the construction of a device for machining turbine seals at the site, which shortens repair times by 3 or 4 days.

Another device has been developed for making sharp curves in heater tubes, and a machine producing turbine seals has been improved.

At this time the shop is making a set of parts that will be used in a mesh-filter for sea water. Its function is to eliminate impurities from the cooling water used in the Cienfuegos plant. Its cost on the world market is 800,000 pesos. This is the first time that such equipment is being built in Cuba.

A real labor of craftsmanship has gone into making oil sprayers. This year, over 500 of these have been produced. The installation of these devices, replacing worn out equipment, is saving Cuba substantial quantities of this so-called "black gold." According to the tests done, this equipment has the same characteristics as equipment purchased abroad.

Although it is by no means a plaything, when we look at the large-scale model of a gigantic circulation pump, made of wood, it seems as if we were in front of a marvelous toy. It belongs to the Tallapiedra unit, and two trucks had to be used to ship it to the Union de Reyes foundry.

Another impressive model was made of the circulation pipes of a 100,000-MW plant located at Mariel. For its production, a capitalist company asked a price of 2 million pesos in convertible currency.

These examples show the broad range of products developed at Emilio Ayala Molina, an enterprise engaged in building and repairing turbine parts, boilers, generators, and other primary equipment used for electric power plants.

Defective Iron

"We don't have any major problems with supplies," said Reinaldo Pinero, "although there have been some difficulties with our cutting tools, so we have been reusing knife handles; they are put on blocks and sharpened in the shop."

"But an entirely different matter is the poor quality of the iron and bronze pegs we get from the Enrique Jose Varona and Sergio Gonzalez foundries. At times we have had to use 19 cast iron pegs to make just one piece, since there have been defects or pores in the material that make the item useless. The worst of the matter is that these defects become visible when the piece is about to be finished, so the time spent is wasted, a salary is paid needlessly, and a piece is wasted."

We also heard the same criticism of the quality of cast iron earlier at the Cuban-Hungarian Friendship enterprise. We told Reinaldo about this, asking him if a complaint had been filed with State Arbitration about this noncompliance with the quality standards stipulated in the contract.

"We have filed such complaints," he told us, "but the time that goes by between receiving these products and using them in the shop is usually quite long. When the defects are found, when they are to be used, the time stipulated in the contract for filing a complaint has already expired. This 'defect' in the contractual mechanism is a problem for us, and we are trying to find a solution."

Given the repeated nature of the criticism about the poor quality of the iron and bronze supplied by the Enrique Jose Varona and Sergio Gonzalez foundries, we promise our readers that we will visit both facilities soon, in order to try to find out why they are producing these defective items.

Compliance with the Plan

Until September	Quantities	Percentage of Compliance to date	Percentage of Compliance at same time last year
Orders (units)	2,237	131	154
Pieces (units)	87,075	133	168
Value (pesos)	1,847,200	138	180

In relation to the annual plan, what was achieved just up to September was already a level of 1 percent overcompliance with orders: 3 percent with parts; and 5 percent overcompliance with the monetary value of the plan.

Emulation: Seeking Solutions

If the level of compliance with the plan at the "Emilio Ayala Molina" shop can be described as a "great leap forward," with even more reason can the development of the spirit of emulation be described in the same way.

"Last year we were in last place in emulation among the 14 establishments of our facility," Arnulfo Apezteguia, secretary general of the union section, told us. "However, during the first 2 quarters of this year we have been in the lead. This shows the effort we have made. We have made a commitment to complete the year with 600,000 pesos above the plan."

We asked if everything is going along without problems.

"Although the work is going well, we still have some problems. We lack discipline on the job, and work safety and hygiene cause some difficulties. We have a high number of accidents, and though they may be caused at times by a lack of safety equipment, as was the case with safety goggles, it still is true that we do lack a sense of discipline and strict adherence to regulations in this aspect of our union work."

"Material incentives are a part of the emulation program," concluded Rene Ferrer, emulation secretary of the union bureau of the enterprise. "We select the best workers from all our establishments, and send them, with a companion, to Varadero for 4 days. This is a just reward for the people who make these productive achievements possible."

7679

CSO: 3248/281

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT WITH ITALY--The Dominican Government has signed an agreement with the Italian Government to exploit the country's geothermal potential. The Italian Government will grant \$434,000 to the Dominican Republic to exploit the northern and southern regions near Constanza, Canoa and Barahona. The agreement was signed by (Ramon Albuquerque), technical secretary of the presidency, and Director of Mining (Miguel Pena) for the Dominican Republic and (Gianambria Crema) on behalf of Italy and the EEC. [FL151410 Santo Domingo Radio MIL Network in Spanish 1000 GMT 15 Dec 82]

CSO: 3248/436

BRIEFS

GASOLINE CONSUMPTION DOWN--Following the price increase to 20 pesos per liter of Nova and 30 pesos for premium, consumption of gasoline in the country has fallen between 25 and 30 percent, it was reported yesterday. In the Federal District alone consumption fell 26 percent, going from 17 million liters a day to 14 million liters, reported Maximo Hernandez Ayala, secretary of the Lazaro Cardenas Independent Movement. It is also calculated that fuel consumption will decline even further after January, when most motorists will probably have spent their extra year-end income. At the time of the increase in the price of gasoline, the country's daily consumption was 66 million liters, and now the quantity hardly exceeds 50 million liters. The greatest reduction in purchases is in the southern and central parts of the country; along the northern border there continues to be practically no change in sales. [Text] [Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 17 Dec 82 p 4-A] 9746

CSO: 3248/405

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Not Subject to Negotiation

PA142214 Buenos Aires LATIN in Spanish 1921 GMT 14 Jan 83

[Text] Belize, 14 Jan (LATIN-REUTER)—A spokesman for the Belizean prime minister said today that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belize are not subject to negotiation.

The comment was a reaction to statements made this week by Guatemalan President Efraim Rios Montt, who said that Guatemala would reduce its long standing claim over Belize to the southern fifth of the country.

The Belizean Government spokesman explained that, even though his country considers the Guatemalan claim unfounded, Belize is not against granting Guatemala free access to the Caribbean and its economic area.

He also suggested the possibility of establishing joint programs for economic cooperation, but gave no details.

However, he explained that there will be no compromise that would cede or reduce Belize's sovereignty.

Belize, a former British colony, achieved its independence 16 months ago.

Guatemala said earlier this week that it would hold talks on 24 January in New York with Belize and Great Britain on Belize's independence, which Guatemala refuses to recognize due to its territorial claims.

On U.S.-Guatemalan Sale

PA150032 Paris AFP in Spanish 1700 GMT 14 Jan 83

[Excerpts] Belize City, 14 Jan (AFP)—It has been officially reported that Belizean Prime Minister George Price has protested before the U.S. Government for the announced sale of military spare parts and weapons to Guatemala.

Price expressed his concern to recently-appointed U.S. Ambassador Malcom Barnebey, recalling that Guatemala still has not recognized Belize's independence--proclaimed in 1981--and claims Belizean territory as its own.

The Belizean Government is particularly concerned over the U.S. decision to sell Guatemala \$6.3 million worth of military equipment and spare parts for helicopters, as was announced last week in Washington.

In addition, a spokesman for the prime minister's office said today in the Belizean capital of Belmopan that his country welcomes the latest statements by the president of Guatemala, indicating that the Guatemalan Government "seems to be ready to recognize Belize's independence."

Guatemalan President General Efraín Ríos announced yesterday that his country would be willing to recognize that independence in exchange for the district of Toledo, in southern Belize.

The government spokesman pointed out that the Belizean Government also welcomes Guatemala's intentions to solve the controversy through peaceful negotiations.

The Belizean spokesman stressed that this position "concurs with Belize's desire to reach a peaceful solution to the problem, though without violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity."

CSO: 3248/437

VALDES VIVO DISCUSSES REVOLUTIONARY FORCES' UNITY

Havana CUBA SOCIALISTA in Spanish No 4 Sep-Nov 82 pp 54-77

[Speech by PCC Central Committee member Raul Valdes Vivo, delivered at the international theoretical conference on "General and Particular Features of the Revolutionary Processes in Latin America and the Caribbean"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The peoples of Latin America, identified by geographical proximity, similar cultural traits, and common origin and historical development, have as their heritage mutual efforts, sacrifices and hopes that have been forming and enhancing the masses' store of revolutionary experience. At present, the conditions of exploitation on the part of the same enemy, American imperialism, are uniting them, with greater intensity and urgency, in the struggle for national liberation, socialism and peace.

The revolutionary action of the peoples of our America is a source of reciprocal encouragement and reciprocal repercussions. The battle that is going on in one of our countries will have effects on the others, as something of their own. Each battle waged helps to enhance the revolutionary experience of everyone; each step taken in the direction of progress is an impetus toward new conquests on the path of the second, definitive independence.

The victory of the Cuban revolution in 1959 represented a radical shift in favor of the liberation movement in America. Cuba broke off from the concepts related to fatalism, contrived by the imperialist ideology to thwart the desires for liberation in the area. Lenin's predictions about the rise of the former colonies and neocolonies to the front ranks of the struggle against imperialism, and the prophetic ideas of our independence leaders of the last century, found complete materialization in the Cuban revolutionary victory. The transition of the first socialist revolution from possibility to reality, in its previously safe backyard, touched the inner recesses of the voracious Yankee empire, which immediately mobilized its political, economic and military resources to stifle the island. It all proved to be fruitless: it was the beginning of the end of imperialist domination in Latin America.

The identity of the formation of our peoples, and of their social class structures, cannot be viewed simply. The strong common traits which make us brothers comprise, precisely, a unity accompanied by the existence of individual distinctions. In this respect, no abstract formula can, per se, be applied successfully.

Nevertheless, we can summarize the positive and negative experiences of our struggles during these past decades. We are convinced that, regardless of how very dissimilar the concrete conditions under which the peoples come in confrontation with their oppressors may appear, the unity of the revolutionary forces will always be an indispensable premise for leading the masses successfully along the path of their final liberation.

The international communist movement has properly evaluated the Cuban revolutionary process, from the standpoint of its historical significance for the continent and its international influence. A study of some of the most prominent traits of the history of the first socialist revolution on our continent helps in the assessment of the conditions that have cropped up in other Latin American countries, while demonstrating the dialectical unity in the fulfillment of the universal laws and strict observances of the socialist revolution and the unique, individual factors existing in our country and the Latin American area. The dialectics of the general and the particular in the course of the era's revolutions has become a fundamental core of the contemporary ideological struggle. This does not involve merely an academic discussion, but rather a theoretical confrontation linked directly to the most bitter class struggle. The interpretation of the Cuban revolution did not escape this debate, but rather became a necessary reference for opposing positions.

With the same direction, the revolution of 1959 fulfilled to completion the necessary general national tasks; and, with deep agrarian, anti-imperialist, revolutionary democratic roots (emanating from the age-old conditions of oppression, dependence and underdevelopment accumulated by the bourgeois republic), swiftly moved to the tasks inherent in the construction of socialism. National and social liberation progressed in an uninterrupted direction, with a tactical and strategic leadership creatively inferred from the Marxist-Leninist concept at which the top-ranking leaders of the revolutionary vanguard had arrived far earlier.

So, the new features contributed by the Cuban process cannot be viewed as an unprecedented or unrepeatable fact, dissociated from the objective laws of historical events. Moreover, the experience of the Cuban revolution expanded the practical and theoretical potential of Marxism-Leninism as an instrument for transformation and interpretation of reality, and corroborated the universality of the laws discovered by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and their natural connection with the principles of independence and national liberation inherent in our revolutionary tradition. In theoretical terms, it may be claimed with complete fairness and from a completely scientific standpoint, that the first socialist revolution in the Western Hemisphere represented a vital combination, with extraordinary practical qualities, of the general and particular factors present in the course of the world revolutionary process.

A concise assessment of the Cuban revolutionary process entails an analysis of the objective conditions that existed during the 1950's and of the conduct of the subjective factors. Learning the extent to which the former took into consideration what Lenin described as a revolutionary situation will help us to understand how the subjective factors manifested themselves until the unity of the masses was attained, their action was triggered and the political power was conquered.

The political decline of the ruling classes in Cuban society had become particularly evident during the final years of government (1944-48 and 1948-52) of the (Authentic) Cuban Revolutionary Party [PRC(A)]. The PRC(A) came into existence as a social reformist party, and took credit for the democratic, anti-imperialist gains of the revolution of 1933. Upon coming to power in 1944, the "authentic movement" had indisputable popular support, which it would not take long to betray, for the benefit of American imperialist economic and political interests.

The "authentic" governments were tools for the deployment of the anticommunist, antiworker policy promoted from the U.S. through McCarthyism. The attack on the trade unions and the persecution and assassination of labor and student leaders, combined with the scandalous theft of public funds and the administrative corruption exceeding any ever known in the country, were the features of the period. After nearly 8 years of "authentic" power, no one had any doubts that the general elections scheduled to be held in 1952 would give victory to the (Orthodox) Cuban People's Party [PPC(O)]. The governing party, publicly discredited, would not have the strength to change the results at the polls, which would run counter to it.

The PPC(O) was a heterogeneous movement, an offshoot in origin from the PRC(A), which had been formed essentially around the leadership of Eduardo Chibas and the campaign (a just one, but with limited goals) against administrative corruption. The possible advent of this party to power, on the crest of the wave of a genuinely popular movement including the radical elements of the orthodox youth and the Popular Socialist Party (which would correctly cast its votes in favor of the orthodox group, despite the fact that the latter did not want to make an agreement with it out of obvious anticommunist prejudice) was, of course, not a prospect propitious for the American imperialists and the country's reactionary classes. Owing to the mass support that it had, the orthodox group was able to go beyond what its vacillating, bourgeois leaders desired.

The political crisis was triggered by the coup d'etat of 10 March 1952, led by Batista and backed by Eisenhower's imperialist government. The coup d'etat which drove the "authentic" government from power without any resistance on the part of the latter was actually aimed against the popular masses backing the PPC(O), and represented a revision of the revolutionary conquests of the revolution of 1933.

The reactionary, pro-imperialist quality typified the Batista government from the date of the coup d'etat until its overthrow on 31 December 1958, a period in which it governed against the people's will, starting provocations and bloody persecutions aimed against the communists and the democratic and opposition elements. The number of assassinations perpetrated by the tyranny is estimated at over 20,000. Torture and crime were the bases for the government's method, with extremes that recall the Nazi-fascist police regimes. Furthermore, Batista and his followers exceeded the administrative corruption which had typified the previous governments. Gambling would be (as it was during the worst years of colonialism) a daily element in Cuban social life. In the games permitted alone (50 percent of those which actually existed), bets were made in excess of 256 million pesos per year, an amount larger than that of the 1952 state budget.

The sociopolitical crisis in the ruling class worsened the economic situation which, at the beginning of the decade, showed a certain amount of prosperity, owing to the suicidal policy of squandering the foreign exchange that had been accumulated; which, in the long run, would entail a greater deterioration, as was demonstrated during the years of the tyranny. Batista's attempts to apply Keynesian economic methods had catastrophic results.

In 1957, the number of unemployed and underemployed reached 700,000, and would continue to increase; because it was estimated that, each year, 140,000 Cubans were reaching working age. The sugar industry (the country's leading one) showed a declining situation. In 1952, sugar production totaled 7 million tons, but this production, the largest in prerevolutionary Cuba, would bring about a collapse in the international sugar market and a drop in prices. The subsequent sugar harvests during the decade were reduced, because of the implementation of a restrictive policy. The sugar harvest periods became increasingly shorter. Cuba's traditional dependence on American interests became accentuated during the Batista government, until it exceeded the bounds of the most abject submission. In 1950, the Truslow mission had made certain recommendations for achieving "Cuban economic development." These recommendations, which could not be carried out by the government of Carlos Prío, would be part of Batista's economic policy, and would be aimed, among other things, at legalizing layoffs and drastic wage cuts, foisting the burden of the economic difficulties upon the working classes and, eventually, attracting the flow of new American investments. *

Combined with the unemployment existing in rural and urban areas, were illiteracy, unhealthy conditions, a housing crisis in the urban areas, the brutal evictions of farmers and their lack of land in comparison with a small number of powerful landholders.

The political crisis was accompanied by the legal crisis. In order to put his anti-democratic and anti-Cuban endeavor into practice, Batista did away with the Constitution of 1940, which was of a democratic and advanced nature for the time. Actually, the pro-imperialist bourgeoisie were incapable of implementing the progressive policy of this constitution. Its features may appear timid to us but, despite its bourgeois nature, it was to some extent useful as a barrier to the reactionary excesses. Evaded over and over again by the "authentic," the Constitution of 1940 was savagely trampled upon by Batista, and replaced by the so-called Constitutional Statutes, which gave a legal burial to the people's long-upheld desires. Once again, it was demonstrated that the bourgeoisie were incapable of converting the democratic principles which they proclaimed, as a result of the pressure from the popular forces at the times of revolutionary prosperity, into a reality.

In its typical features, Cuba's sociopolitical reality foreshadowed what Lenin described as a revolutionary situation. To understand it in its total dimensions, a more extensive explanation than we can undertake within the limits of this conference would be required. It is, indeed, essential to cite a few points

*See B. Besada: Critical study of Keynes' "General Theory." Social Sciences Publishers, Havana, 1981; C.R. Rodríguez: speech at the Eighth National Assembly of the Popular Socialist Party. "Eighth National Assembly." Popular Publications, Havana, 1960; State Statistics Committee: "Some Concepts of Cuba's Development During the 1950's," Havana, 1961, Vol I.

relating to the social classes at that time in history, essentially the working class and its allies, the driving forces of the revolutionary process.

II

The Cuban working class, which arose toward the end of the 19th century, showed signs of rapid concern with politics, when it held its first congress in 1892. Although, when it initially took off, the labor movement was burdened with reformist and anarchist movements, the Cuban workers, as a revolutionary force, joined the war of independence led by Jose Marti in 1895 which, as everyone knows, would not culminate in the victory of the revolutionary-democratic ideas proclaimed by the latter, but rather in disappointment, owing to the American intervention in 1898.

During the 1920's, the Cuban National Labor Confederation (CNOC) was founded. In 1925, the Communist Party of Cuba was organized, under the direction of Julio Antonio Mella and Carlos Balino, among others. The rise of the communist movement in Cuba was associated primarily with the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, which has constituted the greatest encouragement for peoples' struggles all over the world. The Cuban revolutionary traditions, Marti's democratic ideas and the Marxist-Leninist ideology comprised the thinking of the working class and of other progressive workers. Fidel Castro was right when he stated: "The concept that inspired the revolutionary strategy which brought about the victory in 1959 was precisely the unification, the hybridization of a tradition, of a particular experience of our country, with the essential ideas of Marxism and Leninism. A country without Cuba's traditions and without Cuba's history could not have attained a victory of this kind, an advancement of this kind, at that date. But a country with Cuba's traditions, lacking in the essential concepts of Marxism-Leninism (particularly with regard to a group of fundamental issues), could not have achieved such a step forward, by any means, either." *

In 1933, the vanguard revolutionary movement succeeded in overthrowing the tyrannical, pro-imperialist government of Machado, and in this respect a leading role was played by the working class and the Communist Party of Cuba, then headed by Ruben Martinez Villena.

Upon the fall of Machado and after the 100-day government (among whose members there was a confrontation between the revolutionary proposals embodied by Guiteras and the reformists and right wingers personified by other leaders), which was overthrown by Batista's betrayal, a new period of brutal antiworker, anticommunist and antidemocratic repression scourged the country. It was incumbent on the working class and its party to play a heroic role of determined combat against the reactionaries, one of the most dramatic episodes of which was the general strike of 1935, which was to be crushed with bloodshed and the failure of which was due

* F. Castro: Speech delivered at the centennial of Lenin's birth, Havana, 27 April 1970. "The October Revolution and the Cuban Revolution," publications of the Revolutionary Orientation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana, 1977, p 170.

largely to the lack of unity among the popular forces. In 1938, the pressure from the masses achieved the legalization of the party, which then took the name of Communist Revolutionary Union and, subsequently, that of Popular Socialist Party.

The history of the Cuban communist and labor movement is a reflection of revolutionary loyalty, integrity, altruism and capacity for sacrifice. It attests to the movement's unflagging political preaching and action on behalf of the unity of the working class, and the organization and struggle of the peasant movement and that of all our people, throughout 35 years of work on behalf of the victory of Marxist-Leninist ideas in our country. From among its members there arose leaders such as Jesus Menendez and Lazaro Pena, who occupy a prominent place in the history of the international labor movement.

The ideas of Marxism-Leninism, disseminated systematically in Cuba, particularly starting in the 1920's, had an influence not only on the working class and the peasantry, but also on other working classes, especially the intellectuals and students. In the anti-Machado revolutionary process, and in the light of the subsequent struggles, the best of Cuba's intellectuals embraced the ideals of the working class in a militant fashion, or were influenced by them. Men such as Juan Marinello, Nicolas Guillen and Alejo Carpentier, to cite just a few of the leading figures among Cuban intellectuals in this century, were won over by Marxist-Leninist ideas very early. The presence of a progressive, anti-imperialist and, in single instances, communist intellectual class is an element to be considered when analyzing the conditions which preceded the victory of the Cuban revolution.

Cuban student youth, despite the fact that it was comprised of elements the majority of which originated among the bourgeoisie and the petite-bourgeoisie, maintained a vanguard position with respect to the different political phenomena that cropped up, particularly after the founding of the University Students Federation by Julio Antonio Mella. It was a sounding board for the sociopolitical movement in Latin America and the world, from the time of Sandino's struggles in Nicaragua to the backing of Arbenz' democratic Guatemala, without overlooking the Spanish Civil War, which was so militantly and ardently felt in Cuba. Throughout an irregular political process, Cuban students played a positive role, often in close relationship with the labor organizations, despite the bourgeois atmosphere that prevailed at the university.

The ruling classes of Cuban society, sometimes with trickery and at other times using terrorism and repression, made great efforts to divide the labor movement, to curtail and stamp out the workers' organizations, to stifle the peasants' struggle for land and to corrupt the intellectuals and students, sowing the seed of division and anticommunism in all sectors.

The anticommunist propaganda increased after the end of World War II, and the outbreak of the cold war. Cuba was perhaps the country most dependent on American imperialism in the economic and political areas. The relations of subordination to the U.S. exceeded those of some colonial countries with their mother countries. The majority of the press was reactionary. The political differences among the various newspapers and magazines were secondary to the shared anticommunism. Television and radio were almost completely in the hands of American interests.

The state apparatus responded to the requirements of the American imperialists. The Army, advised by American military, improved its coercive capacity through the creation of the Subversive Activities Repression Group (GRAS) in Prio's time, and the Military Intelligence Service (SIM) and Regimental Intelligence Service (SIR) in the time of Batista who, in 1955, founded the Communist Activities Repression Bureau (BRAC), of obvious American origin, which combined its criminal activity with the peculiarly aggressive action of paramilitary groups.

During the cold war years, the labor organizations were attacked and repressed, and finally a corrupt, reactionary, pro-imperialist leadership was forced upon the labor movement, using fascist methods. Labor leaders and militants were assassinated with impunity. For this reason, although Batista's coup d'etat was condemned by the great popular masses, there were no organizational conditions to make possible an effective response to the reactionary putsch. Batista took advantage of the circumstances inherited from the Prio government, carrying to its most repulsive form the divisionist, corrupting and criminal policy against the labor and popular movements.

III

A year after the coup d'etat, on 26 July 1953, the storming of Moncada Barracks took place. Fidel remarked: "It was necessary, once again, to wield the banners of Baire, Baragua and Yara. A final assault was necessary to complete the work of our ancestors, and that was on 26 July. What brought about that assault was not the enthusiasm or courage of a handful of men; it was the result of deep meditation on the peculiar combination of objective and subjective factors which prevailed in our country at that time." *

The dialectical relation between the objective and subjective factors is marked by bonds with reciprocal influence, which can only be analyzed under the concrete historical conditions of each revolutionary process. When they are studied in ours, the fulfillment of the general laws of history set forth by Marxism-Leninism, under the specific conditions in Cuba, can be demonstrated.

"The storming of Moncada Barracks did not represent the victory of the revolution at that instant, but it indicated the path and outlined a program for national liberation that would open the doors of socialism for our country." ** Those who insist upon comparing the Cuban revolution with the Leninist statement regarding the need for the party in the revolutionary struggle have rejected the objective analysis of the Cuban reality, or have knowingly distorted it. The fact that the movement headed by Fidel did not belong organically to the international communist movement does not deny the decisive influence that the Marxist-Leninist

* F. Castro: Speech delivered on the 20th anniversary of 26 July, Santiago de Cuba, 26 July 1973. In F. Castro and R. Castro: "Selected Speeches"; Political Publishers, Havana, 1978, p 114.

** "Main Report," First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba; published by the Revolutionary Orientation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana, 1975, p 27.

ideology, known to and shared by its top-ranking leaders, had on it. The tactics and strategy carried out under Fidel's leadership confirm the validity of the Marxist principles.

In an interview granted to REVISTA INTERNACIONAL, Fidel clearly explained: "The implementation of those principles led us to the conquest of revolutionary power, even when we were not placing emphasis on socialism, even when we were not talking about Marxism-Leninism in a particular phase. In our own struggle to overthrow the tyranny, in our own struggle to establish a revolutionary government, a socialist goal had not yet been set, but rather a vanguard program, such as the Moncada program was, which we might now term a popular, democratic, national liberation program. In our opinion, it was impossible, under the conditions in Cuba, to propose socialism as a goal at that moment in history. It could have been proposed theoretically; there were Marxist organizations in existence; there was a Marxist party in existence. But under those cold war conditions in this hemisphere, with imperialist domination in Cuba, it had few chances of winning over the majority of the people, and few chances of surmounting the enormous obstacles to a socialist revolution that existed in our country under those conditions.

"In other words, we were capable of channeling the great dissatisfaction of the people, the dissent, the poverty and the misery that existed, and of channeling those forces which still lacked a great political consciousness, a political culture. Because we must not forget that Cuba was a Yankee semi-colony, in which all the mass media, the press, radio and television, were in the hands of the imperialists and reactionaries. So, in a way, they had succeeded in isolating the Marxist-Leninist party in Cuba." *

The national liberation program of "History Will Absolve Me" did not proclaim socialism, but was based on a Marxist-Leninist analysis of our circumstances. The goal of the 26 July program was to achieve the greatest amount of unity among the popular forces around the most advanced targets put forth at that time. It was precisely unity of desire that Lenin considered an essential requirement for the popular-democratic revolution, and that, in Cuba, could only lead to the socialist revolution. The storming of Moncada Barracks raised up the program capable of uniting the Cuban people, just as, over 50 years earlier and under the specific circumstances of that era, the Manifesto of Montecristi had achieved it for the independence struggle.

If the analysis of the concrete status of the program backing the action at Moncada shows the Marxist-Leninist nature of the ideology of Fidel and his comrades, the period wherein they were in prison was one of delving deeply into the revolutionary ideology of Marx and Engels, and improving the revolutionary tactics and strategy, and the propaganda on behalf of the battle that had been undertaken. A study of the documents preserved from this period, rightly called "the fruitful imprisonment," constitutes an inestimable contribution to the understanding of the ideas and projections of the revolutionary movement and its supreme leader.

* F. Castro; "Marxism-Leninism and the Cuban Revolution"; REVISTA INTERNACIONAL, No 1, Prague, 1979, p 5.

In Cuba, the only historically possible route to the conquest of political power by the working classes was to be armed struggle. This fact, assumed by Comrade Fidel and the combatants at Moncada, would continue with the "Granma" landing and the waging of the revolutionary war, and it would lead to the revolution's final victory in January 1959. The first Marxist-Leninist party had given an early warning of this prospect; but, apart from the fact that, as was acknowledged in the Report to the Eighth Assembly of the PSP [Popular Socialist Party], concrete measures were not adopted in this direction over a long period, under the Cuban conditions, the task of heading the revolutionary movement necessarily had to be the work of "new communists," among other reasons, as Fidel explained, "... because they were not known as such, and they did not have to suffer, within our society, infested with imperialist prejudice and police control, the dreadful isolation and exclusion suffered by the altruistic revolutionary combatants of our first Communist Party." *

The unity of the popular forces and the revolutionary movement would be created and intensified around the Rebel Army and its commander in chief. Blas Roca commented in 1960: "Fidel's great historic merit was that, while simultaneously gleaning the essential points from the immediate revolutionary program, he saw the opportunities for armed struggle to overthrow the tyranny and to pave the way for the revolution; and he took the necessary practical steps to organize and carry out that armed struggle, backed by the mobilization, unity and struggle of the masses in the urban areas and in the rural areas in which the battles did not take place, despite the initial defeats and hardships of the long struggle, until the decisive victory was attained over the army of the tyranny and its imperialist advisers." **

The armed struggle was a reflection of the class struggle and the decisive means which created unity and allowed for the conquest of political power; the Cuban revolution made use of all the means of struggle to back the victory of the course of action that had been selected. Thus, the mass struggle attained dimensions of great social significance, such as the sugar workers' strike of 1955, and the feverish, incessant activity of the youth movement. Particularly important were the mass actions triggered to thwart the efforts of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists to lend the tyranny a democratic facade, or to achieve an ostensible solution to the political crisis with Batista or without him, as the case might be, but retaining the reins of political power. Thus, the attempts of the so-called Society of Friends of the Republic, aimed at conciliating the opposition to the government, with the exclusion of the communists, in search of a fleeting political solution, were courageously fought by the revolutionary organizations. The material and moral support for the Rebel Army was a task performed by clandestine combatants of 26 July, the Popular Socialist Party, and the 13 March Revolutionary Directorate, which played a leading role in the conquest of victory.

At the same time that the reactionaries were being harassed, the imperialists were thinking up new ways of masking the government, resorting to old procedures, such

*"Main Report," First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, pub. cit., p 26.

** B. Roca: "Evaluation of the Party's Work Since the Last National Assembly and the Development of the Revolution"; Eighth National Assembly, pub. cit., p 72.

as replacing the tyrant with another one of their agents and, with the change of persons, causing the illusion of more deepseated changes; methods which, on more than one occasion, had caused the revolution in our countries to be aborted.

The final efforts in this direction were made on 1 January 1959. The tyrant, together with the closest members of his staff, gave up the government at a time when the Rebel Army was virtually controlling the provinces of Las Villas, Camaguey and Oriente, and there were guerrillas in Pinar de Rio and Matanzas; and when the invasion, victorious in the battle of Santa Clara, was spreading toward Havana. The American Embassy attempted various formulas, such as giving the power to other members of the military who were allegedly "not corrupt," or to the "most senior" magistrate of the Supreme Court. From Oriente Province, Fidel Castro called for the general strike which, this time, would include the entire country and would give victory to the Rebel Army. The event highlights the role of the working class at a decisive, historical time for the revolutionary struggle.

But it would be wrong to assume that the hegemony of the working class began with the strike of 1 January. As Carlos Rafael Rodriguez comments in his essay entitled "Cuba in the Passage to Socialism": "Hegemony of the proletariat means that the interests and ideas of the proletariat are imposed on the revolutionary process, and are expressed by the leadership of that process as the fundamental ideas and program." * With the specific features of our process, that hegemony was manifested from the outset, and was consolidated in the revolutionary action.

IV

Within the international communist movement and, most especially, in that of Latin America, it is well known that the Cuban revolution has confirmed the Leninist theory of uninterrupted development of the revolution, which completes the agrarian, anti-imperialist popular-democratic phase, and begins the phase of socialist construction.

The tasks associated with the first phase, carried out by the Cuban revolution, were the following:

1. Destruction of the bourgeois-landholder pro-imperialist state apparatus, and creation of a patriotic, popular, democratic state. This process began with the very victory of the revolutionary war: the repressive military apparatus was destroyed and the American military mission which had been advising it was expelled within a short time, with the Rebel Army, a guarantee of national sovereignty and of the revolutionary conquests, remaining in its place. In October 1959, in view of the aggression from the U.S. and the rise of counterrevolutionary gangs spurred on by the latter, the National Revolutionary Militias were created, with new contingents of workers and peasants, and other workers. Moreover, the old state institutions were replaced by revolutionary institutions, with the Council of Ministers operating as head of the latter.

* [reference missing]

2. Radical economic changes which implemented the Moncada program and transcended it, laying the groundwork for other new ones that were more deepseated and necessary. The most significant of these measures was the Agrarian Reform Law (of 17 May 1959), which liquidated the large landed estates of the foreign monopolies and the national oligarchy, turned over the land ownership to the peasants who had until that time been working it with the status of exploited people, and nationalized the large estates, maintaining them as major production units.

Other measures were the reduction of rents by 50 percent, and that of electric and telephone rates, as well as the confiscation of the property of the misappropriators, whereby a considerable number of business firms became the property of the state. The large estates and these properties which were "recovered" originated the area of state property, the embryo of the future socialist sector.

3. Establishment of a really popular and effective democracy, release of political prisoners, application of justice to war criminals, based upon irreproachable legal standards and guarantees, purging and reorganization of the judicial system, reinstatement of the workers laid off from their jobs, elimination of the trade union clique imposed by the reactionaries and creation of an atmosphere of equality, freedom and human solidarity in the country, for the first time in our history.

With the completion of the tasks of the first phase, which were not separated from those of the second by an insurmountable wall, Fidel Castro could have reiterated Lenin's comment: "...from the democratic revolution we shall immediately proceed, within the limits of our strength, the strength of the conscious, organized proletariat, to the socialist revolution. We are advocates of the uninterrupted revolution. We shall not remain at the halfway mark." *

And, taking the Leninist path with determination, during the second half of 1960, with the nationalization of the large American companies, the changes in the production relations and the construction of socialism began in our country. The socialist nature of the revolution was proclaimed on 16 April 1961.

The working class, in an alliance with the peasants and other working strata, was the fundamental driving force for the process. The revolutionary measures, while simultaneously consolidating the unity achieved in the preceding struggle, made it possible for the organizations participating therein to become merged into a single one, united around the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the leadership of Fidel.

This conquest of the unity of the vanguard on a higher level, without splits of any kind, could not have been achieved in the absence of a process of adjustment, wherein a decisive role would be played by the waiving of sectarian interests for the sake of the collective interests. This unity was an objective necessity of the class struggle, which rose to its most intense expression, and of the confrontation with American imperialism which triggered aggression of all types against the Cuban revolution.

* V.I. Lenin: "The Social Democratic Attitude Toward the Peasant Movement"; Selected Works, in 12 volumes; Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, Vol III. p 143.

As the American imperialists intensified their aggression against our people, understandable defections occurred among those who were incapable of remaining loyal to the cause that had been initiated. "We have not excluded anyone," commented Fidel, referring to those who were not consistent and who became dissociated from the revolution. The bourgeois parties had hoped to replace Batista with a traditional type government; they were completely discredited, and the last bulwarks of the reformist ideology collapsed with them. The revolutionary vanguard, and most especially Fidel Castro, put in evidence before the masses the forces that were opposed to the revolution, exposing the conspiracy between the landholding bourgeoisie, the American imperialists and the elements close to the latter. The native bourgeoisie, owing to its very dependent nature, after a brief interval of support for the revolution that was more ostensible than real, proved that its bond with the American imperialists was decisive when it was time to state its precise political options. The prestige of the revolutionary ideas was founded upon the constructive measures adopted by the revolutionary government, its devotion to the people's interests and the moral integrity of its leaders. The ideas which Marti and Maceo had left as a valuable legacy to our people were merged, in the revolution's endeavor, with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

The rise of the Communist Party of Cuba (a guarantee of the unity and historical continuity of the revolution) was the logical result of the revolutionary process, and one of the great lessons of the revolution. Fidel Castro explains it as follows: "...that unity among the revolutionary forces was exemplary in our country; it is one of the factors which proved decisive in the consolidation of the revolution.

"The movement that we had promoted and created was, indisputably, the one with the greatest force; it had an overwhelming force among the masses, which was very great, but it was also more extensive and more heterogeneous (...). We always opposed sectarianism, because there was a danger of sectarianism at the beginning, among those of us who had been in the mountains fighting and those who had been on the lowlands. One of the first kinds of sectarianism that I have fought is this: so that those who had been fighting in the mountains, who had waged the war, would not feel conceited or feel superior to the others. This applied to the members of our own movement.

"Later, various tendencies developed among the members of our movement; because the movement was more heterogeneous, there was a certain amount of heterogeneity. It was understandable that those tendencies should occur, and they even prompted a great deal of persuasive effort; because it must be said that the vast majority of the movement headed toward the positions of socialism, and Marxism-Leninism, as a result of the effort that was made among the masses themselves in our movement. We realized quite well that the force of the revolution lay in unity, and for this reason, at the outset, there was much fighting against the divisionist tendencies, and the anticommunist prejudice and campaigns; because a great imperialist weapon among those participating in revolutionary processes is that of stirring up anti-communism and fear of communism, because they are divisionist tendencies.

"We, the leaders of the 26 July Movement, had (...) a Marxist concept and training, and that was a very close bond with the Popular Socialist Party: the identity

(so to speak) between, not the great masses, but between the leaders of our movement and the Popular Socialist Party. This created ideological bases which facilitated the unity. In the Revolutionary Directorate also, the leadership had very progressive positions which were very close to socialism. Those were the three organizations which were under a particular social and political leadership...." *

The policy pursued by the Popular Socialist Party, which managed to assess the process correctly, and to estimate Fidel's leadership in its historic dimensions, was a critical element in the formation of the Cuban revolutionary vanguard.

It would be impossible to end this analysis without considering the international circumstances under which the Cuban revolutionary process took place and, most especially, the support from the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. The friendly position, respectful of principles, and the active solidarity maintained by the Soviet Union since the victory of the revolution contributed to the victory of socialist ideas in Cuba, just as they have contributed, and continue to contribute to our heroic struggle on behalf of the construction of a superior society.

For the first time in their history, the Cuban people met with international relations of a new type, based on mutual understanding and mutual respect. The assistance rendered to Cuba is convincing evidence of the proletarian internationalism displayed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a principle of its international policy.

The solidarity of the socialist countries, the international communist and labor movement, the national liberation movement and all of progressive mankind has contributed greatly to the prestige of socialist ideas among our people, to the raising of the political consciousness of the popular masses and to the very survival of the revolution.

The unity of a single party took place gradually, owing to a "...de facto merger, as a result of the rapprochement and the contacts that we had dating before the war, the subsequent contacts and the habit that was created, of consulting with each other over the major problems." ** During the early months, work was done in coordination among the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations. On 26 July 1961, Fidel publicly announced the decision to create the United Party of the Socialist Revolution. On 13 October 1965, the resolution was made to change this name to the Communist Party of Cuba. The significance of its creation was clearly emphasized by Fidel.

*F. Castro: "Marxism-Leninism and the Cuban Revolution"; op. cit., pp 7-8.

**F. Castro: Magazine KOMMUNIST, No 15, Moscow, 1978; quoted by F. Grobart: "The Process of Formation of the Communist Party of Cuba"; magazine CUBA SOCIALISTA, No 1, Havana, 1981, p 72.

"This step has great significance; it signifies one of the most all-important steps in our country's history; it signifies the historic moment when the unifying forces were superior to the forces which scattered and divided; it signifies the historic moment when an entire revolutionary people became closely united, when the sense of duty prevailed over everything else, when the collective spirit triumphed over all kinds of individualism, when the interests of the fatherland prevailed, largely and definitively, over all individual or group interests, it signifies having attained the highest degree of unity and organization, with the most modern, most scientific and, simultaneously, the most revolutionary and human of political concepts." *

Conclusions

It appears fitting to us to conclude with a few brief reflections which summarize the main points in the analysis that has been presented.

In our opinion, it has been determined that, in the Cuban revolution, there has been a combination of the general theoretical statements of Marxism-Leninism with the logical specifics of the exercise of revolutionary practice.

1. Not only has the principle of the necessity for the party in the leadership of the revolutionary process been fulfilled in our case, but also, the Cuban revolution is an example which fully confirms the Leninist theory. Without underestimating the specific features that we have mentioned, it is clear that the revolutionary process was led from the outset by Fidel Castro, heading a political vanguard whose ideology was Marxism-Leninism, apart from the fact that, in its beginnings, it was not "organically" linked with the communist movement.
2. The unity of the political forces and the social classes, the driving forces of the revolution, was achieved by virtue of a revolutionary program which, at every moment, offered what it was possible to achieve through revolutionary action per se.
3. A major role in gaining the unity of the revolutionary forces was played by the accurate leadership of Fidel Castro, the unified and antisectarian resolve of the revolutionary organizations, the hostility of the American imperialists which plainly showed the hatred on the part of the former ruling classes for our people's democratic, socialist conquests, and the solidarity of the Soviet Union, the socialist system and the worldwide communist, progressive movement.

* F. Castro: Speech delivered at the ceremony for introduction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana, 3 October 1965. Quoted by G. Grobart: "The Process of Formation of the Communist Party of Cuba"; op. cit., p 81.

PINEIRO LOSADA DISCUSSES REVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES

Havana CUBA SOCIALISTA in Spanish No 4, Sep-Nov 82 pp 15-53

[Article by Manuel Pineiro Losada*: "Present Crisis of Imperialism, Revolutionary Processes in Latin America and the Caribbean"***; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Revolutions for National and Social Liberation

Every age stamps its imprint on the social revolutions that occur during that historical period. This is also true for national liberation processes. Lenin emphasized this idea when he stated: "The epoch from 1789 to 1871 was a special epoch in Europe. This is indisputable. Not one of the wars for national liberation, especially typical of that time, can be understood without understanding the general conditions during that epoch."^o

The national liberation revolutions during the premonopolistic phase of capitalism were part of the major antifeudal transformations and had democratic bourgeois content. Their predominant capitalist social nature and, consequently, the tasks that had to be developed were inherent to the worldwide spread of that system. Since then, still within the expansion and development of capitalist socioeconomic formations, the anticolonial national liberation processes had their idiosyncrasies conditioned by the type of foreign domination, historic circumstances and the specific economic and sociological situations in those countries. The national factor represented the special distinctive ingredient in those revolutions while the most general characteristic was those countries' placement in the capitalist system.

Because of this double function, the many experiences of struggles for emancipation in our countries in the 19th century keep us from making the mistake of trying to equate them to the European revolutions during that historical period.

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**Paper presented at international theoretical conference on "General and specific characteristics of the revolutionary processes in Latin America and the Caribbean."

^oV. I. Lenin, "On the caricature of Marxism and 'imperialist economics,'" "Selected Works" in 12 volumes, Editorial Progreso, Moscow, 1976, Vol VI, p 69.

Then and now it would not be valid to automatically and indiscriminately apply the general concept of one type of revolution to each specific situation. This, as perhaps no other circumstance, verifies the well-known Marxist-Leninist statement that the soul of Marxism is the concrete analysis of a concrete situation.

During our times, the national liberation revolutions also have individual natures determined by the general crisis of capitalism, the existence of a powerful developing socialist system and the historic confrontation between these two systems. This leads to major differences between the current national liberation struggles and those in the premonopolistic stage of capitalism. Since imperialism creates and maintains the oppression of other countries through new forms of domination--which are based on monopolistic capital and state monopolistic capital--the fundamental characteristic of the revolutions in the underdeveloped countries is the destruction of those premises. Therefore, their primary distinctive feature is their anti-imperialist nature.

At the same time, due to their anti-imperialist nature, contemporary national liberation revolutions are links in the transition process from capitalism to socialism. The most important individual characteristics of those revolutions--their objectives, social composition and tasks as well as their historic strategic path--stem from this. They are more advanced than their predecessors but they maintain a continuity with them that ends in dialectic progress.

The predominant material realities motivate them at one time or another and in different ways to eliminate the bases of all oppression. This is the inevitable solution of dependent countries facing the crossroads at which imperialist exploitation places them.

Therefore, the national liberation revolutions during our times have a profound social content that converts them into international events. They are an indivisible part of a single international revolutionary process in which the basic conflict--socialism versus capitalism--is intensified by the advance of these revolutions.

Their anti-imperialist direction and anticapitalist tendency make them one of the main forces--along with the international socialist system and the international worker movement--to transform the bourgeois system.

The revolutions for national and social liberation in Latin America and the Caribbean are a clear expression and basic elements of those general circumstances.

They are also significant models for the present liberation processes in Africa and Asia. Our revolutions, like those in Africa and Asia, advance along the historic road undertaken internationally in October 1917. They are the three underdeveloped continents that confront imperialism. Because of the material premises of capitalist domination on our continent--with an average development level higher than in Asia and Africa--better conditions have been created for a more intensive and radical advance of the revolutions. In their dialectic development, they undertake democratic, popular and anti-imperialist

tasks in the first stage and, as they develop, tend to carry out purely socialist tasks as an essential part of their own process and in accord with their general historical nature.

The Programmatic Platform of the Communist Party of Cuba states: "There is no insurmountable barrier between the democratic, popular and anti-imperialist stage and the socialist stage. During the epoch of imperialism, both are part of a single process in which the national liberation and democratic measures --that occasionally have a socialist tinge--prepare the ground for purely socialist ones. The decisive and definitive element in this process is the question of who leads it, what class has the political power."*

Thus the national and social liberation processes on this continent must directly and immediately confront imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, the system of domination that conditions the physiognomy of capitalism in Latin America and the Caribbean. National bourgeois states that were constituted more than 150 years ago have matured, despite their deformations, in the majority of our countries. In these countries there is a formidable variety of experience in national and class struggles. They yielded their best results with the victory of the first socialist revolution in the hemisphere, an unequivocal sign of the degree of maturity achieved by these societies. In our America, the proletariat--the main historic agent of the new society--is the most important social force, not only for its qualitative value but for its size in several countries in the region. This does not diminish the extraordinary significance of the poor peasants and other popular forces. Finally, to cite another relevant factor, foreign domination on this continent is exercised by the most powerful imperialist force which attributes a strategic geopolitical nature for its own global interests to this continent. This makes the liberation of our peoples even more difficult, but also more radical and urgent.

These realities are still being expressed as conflicts--with advances and setbacks--during these past 25 years. However, at the end of the last decade and increasingly at the beginning of this decade, our region has shown the highest level of acceleration of the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped areas and even internationally.

The above leads to an original combination of democratic and popular tasks and economic, political and social demands, all of which favor the historic socialist direction of the revolution. This means anti-imperialist tasks of national liberation along with consolidation of the power of the workers, peasants and other working classes against large landowners and capitalist exploitation. In short, it is a complex and dynamic overlapping, an interweaving of the class struggle and the antineocolonial or anticolonial struggle in some countries. Referring to Cuba's experience, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro stated in the Main Report to the First Party Congress: "Our national

*Programmatic Platform of the Communist Party of Cuba published by the Revolutionary Orientation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana, 1976, p 39.

and social liberation was irrevocably united. To advance was a historic necessity; to stop would be cowardice and treason which would have made us a Yankee colony again and the slaves of exploiters."*

It is worthwhile to point out the material and historic realities that explain the intensity, extension, depth and prospects of the present class struggle in our societies and identify the objective and subjective factors causing the present structural crisis of capitalism on the continent, the rise of several revolutionary processes and the growth of the combative movement of the popular masses.

Crisis of Capitalism, Revolutionary Processes in Latin America, Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean, as a reflection of what is happening in reality, there is a crisis in the capitalist models of economic development. The autonomous development plans--attempts by the national bourgeoisie in several countries from the 1930's to the 1950's and subsequent developmentalist variants--became successive frustrations because of the asphyxiating limits imposed by foreign monopolistic capital. With those options eliminated, development variants shrank to only one set of alternatives: the option of imperialist multinational enterprises and the international economic relations that these represent or the revolutionary plan of the popular classes--especially the proletariat--in other words, the socialist way. One operates within the limits of the set of capitalist structures imposed by imperialist domination at the regional level and implies the reproduction of well-known deforming and deformed socioeconomic conditions. This leads to the intensification and complication of conflicts in Latin American and Caribbean underdevelopment, basically the polarization of the class struggle as an inevitable expression of the concentration and centralization of capital. The other permits autonomous development--or true development--based on the conflicts generated by the system of oppression and exploitation. Socialism looms as the only historic solution that makes it possible to overcome the tremendous obstacles of underdevelopment which are insurmountable under the capitalist system.

The Latin American and Caribbean economies, part of the world capitalist system, have been subject to the process of a new capitalist international division of labor promoted by the countries that govern that system since the 1970's. This has meant, first, the consolidation of the hegemony of large monopolistic and financial capital which became the decisive axis of the majority of the economies in the region. Therefore, the fate of economic development in the area depends, as never before, on the overall dynamics of international capitalism. The prolonged crisis that has affected capitalism in recent years has more direct and harsher repercussions in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The process of transnationalization of Latin American and Caribbean economies barely excludes any country. It is expressed, for example, in the complete

*Main Report, First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Editora Politica, Havana, 1982, p 35.

integration of the bourgeoisie on the continent--or their structural dependence--on large monopolistic and financial capital.

In this way, the model of capital accumulation inherent to the new capitalist international division of labor leads to greater integration of the national economies. This new capitalist international division of labor means the developed countries specialize in the production of goods with a more complex technology and advanced science and technology with the objective of maintaining control of the more advanced technologies. At the same time, the service sector grows and the parasitic activities of the monopolistic economy increase, thus confirming this imperialist tendency cited by Lenin.

The underdeveloped countries are "raised" to a more modern level through the incorporation of new production technologies diverted to them by the industrialized countries because of relatively higher density of the work force which these require. That is the reason they are more profitable to exploit in the dependent countries where the working class has much lower wage levels. One of the formulas that has received the most support from transnational capital in recent years is the return to liberal economic relations. As the Chilean case demonstrates, this is an extreme variant of dependence on foreign capital, concentration and centralization of the national wealth by foreign capital and affiliated large "national" capital and the application of the highest rates of exploitation of the workers in the history of our region. Some variants of state capitalism or state monopolistic capitalism--which is also dependent due to the nature of the society from which it springs--rest on the same principle of modernization through the attraction of foreign capital although there are occasionally conflicts with this as a result of eventual differences in interest that can become significant.

It is not our intention to extensively discuss the complexity of that process. We only want to point out its importance in the examination of the topic that concerns us, given the conflicts and new circumstances that it arouses, particularly the tendency toward a reduction in bourgeois democracies and the installation of repressive military regimes. In our opinion, it increases the favorable conditions for the work of the revolutionary vanguards. At the same time, it requires their best fighting ability on all fronts and scientific understanding of the new forms of capitalism in their various international and national manifestations.

We would like to point out some of the contradictions observed in this process which, in one way or another, are present in the majority of the countries in the region.

There is an initial contradiction that arises from the need of the economies in the area to increase investments to achieve development and from the limits that the tight domestic market imposes on them, precisely because of its domination by foreign monopolies.

Paradoxically, the effects of modern technology used by multinational enterprises in their new investments are minimized in the domestic market of the recipient countries since they do not tend to increase the number of jobs.

When old technologies and crafts are displaced, the impact on the domestic market is totally negative.

As a result of monopolistic price control, absolute financial domination and the possibility for expansion due to the bankruptcy of competitors, the multinational enterprises are not especially interested in changing traditional agrarian relations based on large estates.

Therefore, the survival of those archaic agrarian structures--despite their relative modernization as a result of other factors that we will analyze later --and the steady increase of unemployment and underemployment--whose most obvious visual sign is infrahuman slums--impose very narrow boundaries on the expansion of investments. All this translates into greater economic stagnation.

Another significant contradiction is revealed in the overwhelming interest of the multinational enterprises to obtain high revenue to quickly recoup the capital invested and increase their profits. The profits are not reinvested in the country that provided them since the limitations of its domestic market cause the multinational enterprises to deflect the profits to new markets in other countries. This causes a conflict between the need of underdeveloped countries to increase investments and the interest of the multinational enterprises in increasing their overall profitability, thus intensifying decapitalization of the underdeveloped countries and their financial dependence.

As an effect of the new capitalist international division of labor, the endemic inequality in the trade balance and balance of payments of the Latin American countries is manipulated even more by the International Monetary Fund and private international banking with the systematic objective to impose a policy on them that favors the interests of large imperialist capital.

This type of modernizing neodevelopmentalism of dependent capitalism decisively increases the transnationalization of the economies and affects almost all the countries on the continent. It consolidates the hegemony of monopolistic and financial capital as the governing center of the economies in the region. The alliance of this capital with local sectors of large capital is reinforced in a process where denationalization is translated into greater levels of subordination to the imperialist model of accumulation. This dynamics which corresponds to the present stage of crisis and recession in international capitalism ends the earlier stages of relative development of national industry supported by the replacement of imports and the expansion of the domestic market. At the same time, it tends to provoke a crisis in the multiclass populist groups and democratic bourgeois state systems on the political plane.

At the class level, there is an accelerated tendency toward polarization of the social structure, outlining clearer boundaries between the opposing forces. In the majority of our countries, two large class blocs are clearly defined: the classes and sectors organically tied to foreign capital; and a broad base made up by the working class first and then the peasantry, the unemployed, the underemployed and growing segments of the so-called middle sectors.

The crisis in the capitalist models of development in the region has made the question of socialist development as the only alternative to the underdevelopment generated by capitalism more important and relevant.

In the last two decades, economic and political reformism has carried out different variants to lessen the effects of the new capitalist model of accumulation. However, these were all failures due to their weakness in confronting the economic, political and social structures that support the system of capitalist domination in the region. One reformist proposal was to alleviate the class struggle. This has been achieved in only a few cases and for brief periods since the masses tend to radicalize their work even more when not able to solve the basic problems. This increases their awareness about the way to achieve this.

As has been verified in different countries at different times, reformism only aspires to destroy the traditional exporting economy and to share economic power with foreign monopolies as opposed to state capitalism. It is no longer a matter of achieving independence which it knows is unattainable. It accepts the premise of dependence on foreign capital and tries to obtain maximum advantages for national economic interests which it claims to represent.

The social classes that hold that position are usually the civilian and military bureaucracies that are sometimes partially supported by the middle sectors. They try under the new conditions to inherit the function of the national bourgeoisie that failed in its projects of the 1930's to the 1950's. The prevailing material situation now makes the negative outcome of those projects more ominous. Their weakness is not just economic. In the political sphere, they usually accept as inevitable restrictions on the bourgeois democracy and the use of repressive state mechanisms that guarantee high levels of exploitation and poverty of the popular masses.

Coinciding with the worsening of the international economic crisis of capitalism during these years, the negative consequences of the new capitalist international division of labor, the exhaustion of reformist attempts and the decline of democratic bourgeois regimes and the tendency to replace these with dictatorial military governments have become visible in the area. All of this marks the end of a historic stage on the continent and leads to a new scenario for class struggle in which the peoples and their revolutionary organizations find greater potential to develop their struggles. These are more radical due to the nature of the material base that conditions them. Consequently, their national expressions are more complex and diverse. They have a common objective: the final solution to the contradictions in the system of oppression and imperialist exploitation through revolutionary changes in their economic and political structures. That road has already been taken, at their own specific rates and forms, by Nicaragua and Grenada while very promising advances can be seen in El Salvador and Guatemala. Cuba, in the historic vanguard, demonstrated the viability of the alternative and continues along it victoriously.

In the middle of the 70's, Latin America and the Caribbean began a stage of sharp polarization of their social structures, intensification of political

confrontations and increased antagonism between revolution and counterrevolution.

In short, the material bases of the current Latin American and Caribbean revolutionary processes have been created by the changes in the economic and social relations of our countries especially since the 1950's. Those transformations have formed levels--even means--of development of capitalism, a deformed--and deforming--situation that it is necessary to keep in mind in order to define the nature of revolutions for national and social liberation in this part of the world.

The economic growth of capitalism in the region leads to the development of underdevelopment because of imperialist domination and the essential continuation of the archaic agrarian relations based on large estates. These circumstances continually accentuate the contradiction between the nature and development of productive forces and the production relations--in both cases molded by foreign capital, the affiliated local bourgeoisie and the landowners. It is a capitalist socioeconomic formation subordinate to the international imperialist system through neocolonial relations.

This is the historic nature of the present crisis of Latin American and Caribbean societies. It is historic, in addition to being economic and social, because there will not be a substantial change in the development of the continent without anti-imperialist and anticapitalist transformations.

Therefore, the present crisis in the region is also a crisis of imperialist domination, of obsolete agrarian relations and of all the production relations of dependent capitalism. It is a crisis of all these structures tied to a political, legal and ethical crisis. It is a global crisis of society aggravated by the growing negative effects of the general capitalist crisis.

The convergence of these factors and processes determines the historic nature of contemporary revolutions on our continent. That nature does not exclude but rather assumes the possibility of different forms and rates of approaching socialism and different national roads that facilitate access to the first anti-imperialist, democratic and popular stage of the revolution.

However, it is important to point out that the material bases created by the development of capitalism in the majority of the countries on the continent establish the necessary conditions to permit triumphant revolutions to advance continually--although by stages--in a single historic process toward socialism.

One factor that favors that possible outcome is the many experiences accumulated by our peoples in their different intense struggles, especially after 1959. Since then, we have watched the passing of reformist democratic bourgeois movements and different nationalist experiments searching for options for achieving development, independence and self-determination. The working class has worked incessantly along with the rest of the popular movement. Formidable examples have accumulated in the revolutionary use of weapons by the vanguards and the peoples. We witnessed an interesting and useful experiment--the Chilean one--to reach socialism. Old and new military dictatorships

have proliferated. There were uprisings of patriotic military groups and the installation of nationalist governments led by them. There has been notable incorporation of Christian, progressive and revolutionary sectors in the struggle. With their victorious revolutions, Nicaragua and Grenada reaffirmed the validity of the road to power opened by Cuba and thus enriched continental revolutionary culture.

These almost 25 years of battles and sacrifices, impregnated with the blood of thousands of fighters, are the best school for the revolutionary movement of our America. In addition to theoretical and scientific support, the rich experiences accumulated by our peoples from the wars of independence now provide situations they and different revolutionary generations have experienced. Their basic lessons are ample and clear. We have a diversity of experiences and situations, definite advances and temporary setbacks. One truth is reaffirmed time and again, becoming indisputable: the historic progress toward socialism does not merely depend on the objective laws of the capitalist system. In their crystallization, the revolutionary vanguards have the primary and decisive responsibility to encourage that process. This must be especially demonstrated in their ability to lead the peoples to power. This is the cardinal problem of every revolution. It summarizes the different aspects that must be considered and solved correctly to increase the chances of that crucial moment, the end of a complex process and guarantee of development.

There are many factors tied to the problem of the fight for power. However, we consider it indispensable to first examine the class structure and the social forces that objectively tend to participate in the revolution.

Class Structure, Moving Forces of the Revolution

We are not going to discuss this topic extensively since we had the opportunity to do this at the theoretical conference held in 1980. It is of interest here, due to the main objective of the conference, to identify the main participants in the ongoing class struggle on our continent.

An analysis of the class structure is inseparable from its struggles since the struggles, in their development, modify the class structure as well as the other structures of society. Therefore, the first factor to consider is imperialist domination. We consider it the main conditioning element of the class structure and struggle on our continent. Let us examine the bloc of dominating classes.

The modernizing economic processes described have led in recent years to the formation of a new oligarchy that represents the different factions of the large bourgeoisie--industrial, commercial, financial and agrarian. It is subordinate to and shares the same strategy of development and domination as imperialist capital although there are occasionally differences of interest that are not negligible for the tactical battle of the revolutionary movement.

Another ingredient in the bloc of exploiting classes is the declining middle or national bourgeoisie, substantially weakened by the rigors of the alliance of the large bourgeoisie and the multinational enterprises. In general, that

bourgeoisie is reduced to the most traditional industrial sector--nondurable consumer goods--and its possibilities of economic reproduction steadily decline. That circumstance means that many sectors of the middle bourgeoisie can become important allies of the revolutionary process. This does not always depend on the correct tactic but on the interweaving of its interests with different branches of the economy, ideological factors and specific combat situations.

The third force in this bloc is the landowners. In some countries they maintain their power based fundamentally on control of land ownership. In several countries, however, the different capitalist agrarian reforms have affected this class, disintegrating it or modifying it to some degree. In almost all these cases, a sector of capitalist agroexport businessmen, modern farmers and agroindustrialists appears while part of the landowners continues in its traditional form--as owners of large estates. Many of them rent out their land. This dissolution process of the landowning class is still inconclusive in the majority of the countries. There must be many different steps and rates based on the circumstances of each country. However, in the general movement, it should be stressed that the modernizing sector--the large rural bourgeoisie mentioned--tends to improve its ties with local sectors of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie, also subordinating itself to the interests and the model of accumulation of the imperialist bourgeoisie which becomes the beneficiary and main decision center of the new capitalist relations of exploitation of Latin American agriculture.

It should be recorded that this process of agricultural transformations generates conflicts between the sectors of "modernizing" capital and the landowners defending their traditional large estates. The latter react strongly toward certain aspects of agrarian reforms and all those modifications that alter their position, accentuating their reactionary role in class struggles and in many countries forming a significant sector of the counterrevolution.

To summarize, a tendency toward homogenization of the dominating classes can be seen now as never before in continental history. It is caused by the international processes of capitalism indicated above. However, the different levels of economic development of the subregions and countries do not permit absolute generalization--for example, comparing the situation of some countries in Central America and the Caribbean with others on the continent. At the same time, it is useful to note, due to its obvious practical value, that the transformations in the capitalist system in our region lead to several conflicts within the bloc of dominating classes. Some of the more important ones are:

The struggle between sectors of the local large bourgeoisie and foreign monopolistic capital with the former seeking better economic possibilities on the foreign market;

Differences in interest between the large landowners and the large agrarian bourgeoisie;

Conflict between the middle bourgeoisie and the large bourgeoisie or new oligarchy and transnational capital; and

Integrated middle sectors that defend the system but aspire to reform and renegotiate dependence on transnational capital.

The so-called middle sectors should now be examined as a whole. In the Latin American societies, these forces are very difficult to define--perhaps more than in other capitalist countries--because of the diverse elements that form them, the reduced economic stability of many of them and other factors in the dynamics of the class struggle. Because of these characteristics, it is very difficult to place all these sectors in the bloc of dominating classes or in the bloc of exploited classes. It is valid, however, to identify them based on a /class position/. We hold the opinion that they, by themselves, do not make up an organic social class. The basic component of this social force is the urban petite bourgeoisie made up by merchants and small businessmen, self-employed professionals, etc. Different strata of the population can be added: officials, students, public employees, skilled workers, professionals, etc.

The distinctive feature of the middle sectors is their socioeconomic heterogeneity which determines their highly contradictory content. As can be deduced, the middle sectors cannot draw up an independent historic plan. Their components usually need an alliance with a certain class.

On one side, they have an average standard of living that is higher than that of manual workers. They are usually susceptible to being influenced by bourgeois ideology, instilling its values and expectations in them. Some of their strata act as administrators of the capitalist state and are completely committed to it.

On the other side, many of the members of these sectors are wage earners or small businessmen not tied to monopolistic capital or to the local oligarchy. Both suffer from the consequences of the crises of the system and the imposition of the new model of accumulation that pushes them toward poverty or noticeably decreases their standards of living. The absence of individual guarantees and democratic institutionalization has repercussions on these sectors' position toward the system. These factors, among others, make it feasible that many members of the middle sectors will adopt a progressive line and even identify with the interests of the working class.

The political forces of the bourgeoisie, on one side, and the exploited classes, on the other, must attract the members of the middle sectors that are inclined toward one or the other direction or class position for the reasons noted. Those sectors--which are very large in the majority of our countries and always have an important qualitative role--have a strength that is decisive for the victorious development of Latin American revolutions. That is the reason for the priority attention that the parties and organizations representing the exploited classes give them. They want to isolate their reactionary layers, neutralize and attract their ambivalent elements and win over for the revolution those who are objectively in the position to join that historic plan. Many components of the middle sectors often become a vanguard force, catalyst of the revolutionary struggles of their peoples with an important weight in the vanguard.

Due to the transformations in the capitalist structures in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years, there have been some changes in the internal balance in the bloc of exploited classes. The levels of relative and absolute impoverishment of all oppressed classes and sectors have worsened notably.

Because of the new processes of industrialization indicated, the working class tends to be more heterogeneous in its sectorial composition which helps make it more representative of all the interests of the people. At the same time, it is necessary to consider that the ongoing industrialization tends to concentrate the sector of workers associated with it and stratify it with respect to the rest of the class. This is intensified where the importance of other economic sectors diminishes or disappears--for example, medium and small national industry and mining. Such differences should be taken into consideration to keep them from becoming obstacles to the unity of the industrial working class.

The rural sector of the proletariat has also been modified. The expansion of capitalist agricultural relations leads to a relative increase in that vital segment of the working class. What is even more important, it generates greater concentration because of the large estates. It increases their capacity for class organization which is also sometimes benefitted by superior skill and ties with the urban industrial proletariat.

The broad masses of the peasantry--which are poor--constitute the other basic class within the popular bloc. The peasantry in our countries continues to have different segments--different types of sharecroppers, small landowners, usufructuaries of land with undefined ownership, etc.--but the common factor that characterizes them is their extreme and worsening poverty. The most inhuman forms continue to be concentrated among the Indians who are subject to the highest levels of exploitation and social isolation.

The peasantry is still the largest sector in the rural population of several countries in the region. In others, this is no longer true as a result of capitalist agricultural transformations. The peasant landowners suffer the pressure of competition with large productive estates which frequently ruins or strips their parcels. That process generally leads to elimination of the peasantry since capitalist agricultural modernization tends to reduce the composition of that class through proletarianization and semiproletarianization and the exodus toward the cities, mainly its outer rings. At the same time, in several regions as the amount of land to which the peasants have access decreases--or remains the same--the population increase means that the small properties cannot function as parcels for family subsistence. This complex situation increases the awareness of the peasantry about the need to carry out in-depth agrarian reforms and increases the potential of their demands and revolutionary struggles. Objectively, this leads to better possibilities of development of their alliance with the working class.

At the side of these exploited classes--sometimes part of one or the other or separated by very fine lines--are the urban and rural subproletariat. They represent a large sector of the Latin American and Caribbean population, unstable by nature and in transition. They can become a marginal population,

the lumpen proletariat, or join the productive system. These social forces pressure for solutions to their problems--urbanization of their towns, etc.--which occasionally leads to violent explosions. Because of their composition and condition, they are usually fickle and malleable by the parties of the system although it has also been demonstrated that it is feasible to orient them toward revolutionary objectives when effective work is done with them--for example, with the marginal populations.

To complete the broad range of the social base of the current revolutionary processes on the continent, we must include the large and rising mass of the unemployed, extreme victims of the capitalist system who do not have the slightest possibility to provide for their subsistence.

This group of classes, strata and sectors that shares similar standards of living and situations of exploitation without any possible solution within the dominant system--and many times is also subject to the terrible rigors of reactionary dictatorial governments--must enter into radical conflict with the socioeconomic formation in which it exists. Thus it constitutes the historic subject of current revolutions on our continent. The working class is the basic center of that multifaceted group of forces, all important in the fight for power and in the subsequent development of the socialist plan. It is impossible to equally define the role of each one of those forces in all the countries. Their vanguards must make that analysis and achieve a correct balance in their tactics to optimize their effective participation in the different stages and situations of struggle.

The specifics and variants, conditioned by the general and decisive historic confrontation of our time between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, are indispensable contributions to revolutionary victory on the continent. The outstanding role that the peasants have played in the victorious revolutions and in those developing in El Salvador and Guatemala should be stressed. In this last country, the incorporation of the Indians to the fight for power has been decisive.

Strategy, Tactics of the Revolution; General Considerations

We start with a basic truth: the class struggle cannot be planned or programmed. This is even truer for revolutionary victory. We also start with another known truth: when revolutions are authentic, they always respond to universal laws but their very authenticity makes them unique in national profiles.

It is not our intention to examine the exceptional ingredients and contributions of the victorious, deferred or ongoing Latin American revolutions. This task is very important for the collective political culture of the continental revolutionary movement but we will surely hear an analysis of this topic by other delegates.

We only want to express our considerations about some general factors and problems present in the current processes in the region. Those common ingredients, although they also show their national colors, have been confirmed by

the victories in Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada, are repeated clearly in El Salvador and Guatemala and are visibly present in other developing processes.

For the Marxist-Leninists, the main problem of the revolution is taking power. This means favoring material and subjective conditions that permit the process to advance steadily toward the socialist stage. The first and most important of those conditions is the destruction of the bourgeois state system and its replacement by a revolutionary state based on the hegemony of the proletariat in close alliance with the other popular classes and sectors. That historic rupture is irreplaceable in any true revolution.

All the components of the bourgeois state cannot be destroyed at the same time or with the same methods. However, the nucleus of the state system--its repressive force--is the key to achieving domination over the rest of the state system. Consequently, its destruction is the indispensable and definitive priority for the triumph of any revolution. The repressive machine is ultimately what guarantees the conservation of power by the bourgeoisie; this stands out in crisis situations. It is certainly possible to find substantial differences when comparing the forms of political and ideological domination by the bourgeois regimes. However, these differences are minimal when it comes to the forms of organization and action of the repressive machines of that type of state. Therefore, the problem of power rests mainly on the validity of the strategy to achieve that objective. Thus the revolutionary strategy must at least meet the following requirements: definition of the nature of the revolution; taking the pulse of the international, regional and national balance of power; identification of the main enemy, its allies and the conflicts between them; definition of the leading class of the revolution, its allies and convergent and divergent elements with these forces; and elaboration of the main features of the basic means of struggle selected and the complementary forms that are indispensable for the advance of the revolution.

The strategy of the revolutionary movement is based on scientific criteria which, consequently, are only effective to the degree that they are adapted to the specific realities of each country. The development of the revolution assumes the maturity, over a more or less lengthy period of time, of the leading forces in the double tasks of destroying the old order and constructing the new one. The multiple work of those forces--from the struggles for demands to those with political and military objectives--generates the start of a prerevolutionary period characterized by a high degree of class confrontation and the crisis of the bourgeois power. The incessant activity of leftist parties and organizations is decisive in that process.

Then the possibilities of revolutionary victory increase and the assault on power becomes the definitive test of the effectiveness of the planned strategy and the tactical ability of the vanguard to lead the masses to the decisive goal.

First, the basis of every strategy is the objective conditions that determine it and give it historic viability. Therefore, if the subjective conditions do not correspond to the planned strategy, this does not mean it must be replaced by another of lesser scope. In that case--this is what happens most of the

time--it is necessary to use appropriate tactics to achieve /practical/ understanding of the /viability and need/ for the planned strategy. That understanding results from the complex and dynamic direct participation of the masses who, consciously or unconsciously, assimilate and incorporate the strategy written and directed by the vanguard.

The masses do not act purely by a conviction injected into them from outside--although this does not denigrate the value of revolutionary propaganda. They do not launch themselves into battle through simple faith in the promise of a better world or a future ideal. They accumulate experience by contrasting their own vital interests with the economic and political realities where they live. That is the main school where they learn the strategic road to their liberation and the practical means to travel it. The problem of how to make the strategy triumph can only be solved using different battle tactics.

Consequently, the elaboration and victorious application of revolutionary tactics is the most complex and definitive test of a vanguard. In real life, there is no task more difficult than the adaptation of tactics to the strategic line adopted. While this rests on scientific analysis of reality, the tactics must also consider many temporary factors which are hard to control or predict scientifically. Therefore, daily action requires, in addition to the theoretical training of the vanguard, a special ability and sensitivity to perceive the concrete and real. Only in this way will it be possible to handle the dialectics of the struggle with the flexibility to implement quick and effective decisions in the face of developing events, especially in the revolutionary periods which usually present more unexpected situations.

Strictly speaking, the vanguards and the individual leaders arise from there. In addition to correct strategy, the correct battle tactic must be continually defined and developed. This is, in short, the basic attribute of a legitimate vanguard.

Therefore, the decisive challenge for every vanguard is the elaboration of tactics adapted to the concrete circumstances and the strategic objectives of the revolution. Without trying to stipulate uniform factors to be considered in the formulation of tactics, experience shows that there are certain useful points of reference which have general value. They include: the balance of power at every moment of the struggle; conflicts within the dominating classes; the tactical objectives and political maneuvers of the enemy; the organization; awareness, fighting tradition and social psychology of the masses; and the unity and integral strength of the vanguard.

As is known, none of these factors is static. For example, a metaphysical viewpoint always gives the dominating class more strength than the oppressed classes. However, the balance of power is characterized by its dynamism. Timely and bold action by the revolutionary detachments, with the support of the masses, can cause abrupt changes in its favor. The same is true inversely when revolutionary actions are inadequate or do not reach the level or creativity demanded at that time. History shows the high price that the people pay in those cases since every error, weakness and failure of the revolutionary movement is greatly exploited by the adversary.

Finally, it is important to consider that it is often impossible to define the boundaries between strategy and tactics because of their interrelation and mutual complementation.

When elaborating its battle strategy and tactics, the Latin American and Caribbean revolutionary movement has some basic, permanent conditions: the nature of imperialist domination on the continent and the policy of U.S. governments.

The United States includes our region in the inside and essential nucleus of its world strategy. U.S. imperialism maintains an integral line toward our continent containing all the necessary ingredients for preservation of its hemispheric control. As part of its global strategy, U.S. policy toward its neighbors in the south is based on international and continental principles. In some cases, there are also specific viewpoints on relations with certain countries and subregions.

Along with the economic, military and political importance that the United States attributes to our countries, its arrogance in not accepting the victory of liberating revolutions within what it considers its national security boundaries plays a significant role.

These circumstances mean a worsening confrontation between the democratic, popular and revolutionary processes in the area and U.S. imperialism.

That is why the popular vanguards pay special attention to anti-imperialist objectives in their strategies. They become the main line of strategic and tactical revolutionary combat.

At the same time, we revolutionaries know that the crisis of U.S. imperialism engenders internal political currents and forces with different viewpoints about the best ways to resolve the crisis and maintain world dominion. Therefore, real differences in the shades of various U.S. governments--and even within each one--can be noted. This is naturally expressed in its policy toward our region. Experience teaches that, in tactical plans, we revolutionaries must give the closest attention to the policy that the U.S. administrations develop in order to identify its weakest aspects and obtain the greatest yield from these. Cuba and Nicaragua give us valuable experiences in the correct understanding and appropriate tactical use of the breaches opened in different U.S. governments.

From all the above, it can be deduced that the strategic concept and tactics of the Latin American and Caribbean revolutionary processes must adopt, as their main line, unity of efforts for the defeat of the common enemy. This opinion is shared by all the revolutionary parties and organizations in the region.

The socioeconomic and political changes that these societies demand have, as a prerequisite, elimination of the domination of U.S. imperialism over each country. This means ousting its representatives from power.

Therefore, solidarity among all the anti-imperialist forces is a historic necessity and an unavoidable condition to achieve the national and social liberation of our peoples.

Unity, Masses and Arms in the Fight for Power

The experiences of the victorious revolutions and the many processes developing on this continent confirm the general opinion formulated by comrade Fidel Castro about the three decisive ingredients to achieve revolutionary victory: unity, the masses and arms.

The specific value of each one of these factors should be examined separately.

Life demonstrates that it is not enough to proclaim the need for unity in order to achieve it. This is precisely the way to test the real maturity of a vanguard and complete commitment to the cause of the people. Individual passions, sectarian divisions and other limitations must yield to the collective interests of the masses.

The process of unity includes all the moving forces of the revolution and the allied democratic sectors. Its nerve center is the solid union of the vanguard. When the different detachments of the left succeed in establishing unity in action and have a united strategy and common battle tactics, the popular masses--with instinctive solidarity among themselves--increase that unity until it becomes virtually irreversible. The broader the ranks of forces--both national and international--participating in the fight against the immediate enemy, the greater the imperative need for unity of the vanguard.

At this point in Latin American and Caribbean revolutionary history, this means the objective recognition that, in the majority of our countries, there are experienced communist parties and other leftist parties and organizations have developed. In the struggle they have won the respect of their peoples and many times represent exemplary detachments in the leadership of the people along the road to their complete liberation. Therefore, the unity of those parties and organizations and their unity with the communist parties are indispensable to make the democratic, popular and anti-imperialist revolutions on our continent advance. It is essential to understand the processes of unity and avoid taking superficial steps that are later counterproductive. It is also necessary to have a nonsectarian spirit or spirit of effective cooperation at the different levels of the parties and organizations because, in real life, these often develop their activities in geographic areas and social sectors that, in the long run, complement the development of the revolution.

In those countries where military dictatorships rule, the field of unity expands by including sectors interested only in the destruction of the fascist repressive structures and the return to democratic bourgeois constitutional rule. There the land is even more fertile for an antidictatorial democratic front but under the condition that the revolutionary parties and organizations first consolidate their leadership cell.

We must emphasize the eminently popular nature of the proletarian revolutions in Latin America and the Caribbean. In order to take power and keep it, the working class needs to establish strong political, ideological and military ties with the rest of the masses. The unity of the working class and its allies must be seen in a strong mass policy since it will not spring spontaneously from common economic interests or from the propagandist invocation of those interests.

The premises for unity of action of the popular masses lie in the economic bases of the system. However, the process that leads to that political and ideological unity depends on the action of the vanguards. These--and not economic predetermination--are truly responsible for the achievement of democratic and revolutionary unity.

In several countries in the area, the problem of unity is the main obstacle today for the advance of the revolution. This is a blunt truth but there is evidence that it can also be an incentive to correct the harmful tendency toward leftist division in some of our countries. Every step forward in unity is a step forward on the road to revolution.

Inertia, procrastination and deflection of the road to unity is a gift from the revolutionary movement to the enemy.

The consensus is that the best way to advance in unity is through collaboration in concrete struggles. That direct relationship between the development of revolutionary processes and the unity of the vanguards is verified in El Salvador, Guatemala and in other Central American countries like Honduras. The Sandinist victory reaffirmed, among other important things, the crucial value of unity of the vanguard as the cohesive and guiding nucleus of all the anti-dictatorial, democratic, anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces. We can also see advances in unity in Chile which are promising for the future of the struggles of the Chilean people.

The unity of the revolutionary movement within the boundaries of a country contributes to broader continental and international unity. Concerning the regional dimension, historic and economic factors, confrontation with a common enemy and the political interrelationship of our societies favor mutual objectives and the mutual solidarity of the left. These are only potential conditions and cannot advance effective practical collaboration by the revolutionary forces by themselves.

There must be an individual and collective desire to demonstrate in practice the Latin Americanism and internationalism that is proclaimed. There are many well-known examples of solidarity. We Latin American and Caribbean revolutionaries have given convincing demonstrations of our understanding of internationalism. Nevertheless, it is so important for the victory of national revolutions at one historic time or another and the role of concrete solidarity toward one process of struggle or another is so complex and dynamic that it is still necessary to ask ourselves what we need in order to advance and improve cooperation among all the revolutionary parties and organizations in the area.

Although it does not occur in Latin America to the same degree as in other regions, there is still sometimes confusion about or deviation from the indispensable and wholesome independence that the leftist parties and movements have the right and duty to preserve. However, their true sovereignty assumes rather than excludes the need to make collective efforts to face common international problems and support the revolutionary processes that most urgently need solidarity at any given time.

Finally, with the work for unity, it is essential to give priority to exploiting the conflicts that arise within the dominating classes in each country, on an interimperialist scale or among the countries in the region. The Latin American experience in this confirms Lenin's ideas: "A more powerful enemy can only be defeated by putting all the forces into play and /obligatorily/ exploiting with the greatest zeal, care, prudence and skill even the smallest 'fissure' among the enemies, every conflict of interest between the bourgeoisie of different countries or between the different groups or sectors of the bourgeoisie within each country. It is also necessary to exploit the slightest possibility of achieving an alliance of the masses even if it is temporary, hesitant, unstable, insecure or conditional. Anyone who does not understand this does not understand a single word of Marxism or contemporary scientific socialism /in general/. Anyone who has not demonstrated /in practice/, for a considerable period of time and in varied political situations, his ability to apply this truth in real life has not yet learned to help the revolutionary class in its fight to liberate all of working mankind from the exploiters."*

Although there are many differences in the different countries and subregions, it is possible to give a general characterization of four basic forces with which the Latin American and Caribbean revolutionary movement is developing tactical or strategic alliances. We are referring to social democracy, Christian democracy, Christian movements and progressive military sectors.

Our position concerning the activity and ideological and political content of social democracy was clearly stated by comrade Fidel Castro in the Main Report to the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba.

We realize that social democracy is not a homogenous political force but the inevitable reflection of the different social forces that shape it at the international and regional level and the reflection of interimperialist conflicts. This explains why, despite common political and ideological features, its parties sometimes adopt dissimilar stands toward the processes of the revolutionary struggle which are even occasionally opposing. Therefore, an alliance with the forces of social democracy must be based on clear and honest principles of cooperation without hurting the final objectives for which the revolutionaries fight. We must stress the political aspects that unite us in that cooperation and not the ideological differences that separate us.

*V. I. Lenin, "The childhood disease of 'leftism' in [word illegible]," "Obras completas" [Complete Works], Editora Politica, Havana, 1963, Vol XXXI, p 66.

Although the latter cannot be ignored, they must not become an insurmountable obstacle for united action to achieve common objectives.

In contrast, the most general tendency of Christian democracy is toward active collaboration with the policy and interests of U.S. imperialism. However, that extreme does not mean all Christian democratic forces should be excluded. It also has important sectors that are truly democratic and Christian that have occasionally been forced to openly break with the official and treasonous leadership of its parties. In those cases and given specific national situations, we should extend our hand to them openly and free of prejudice in order to work together on all the tasks that can be shared and with the firm determination to expand these, even in the strategic line to win power and construct the new society.

Our broad view of the Christian movements that include priests and members of the Catholic hierarchy identified with the human, political and economic aspirations of their peoples is well known. On different occasions, comrade Fidel has pointed out the decisive nature of the union between Marxist-Leninist forces and Christians who act with their peoples for the same essential objectives. We consider them brothers in the fight for major historic changes on the continent. There cannot be victorious revolutions without the participation of the large Christian masses in our countries. Consequently, it is a natural act for the vanguards to open the doors to lay Christians, priests and members of the ecclesiastic hierarchy who are committed, many times at the cost of their lives, to the Latin American and Caribbean fight for emancipation. We think that the revolutionary movement in several countries has not yet achieved the necessary and possible progress in collaboration and integration with those forces. In some cases these forces demonstrate a greater desire for unity and a better practical understanding of their revolutionary role.

Another problem that it is important to discuss is relations with the progressive military. In our opinion, the conduct of the armed forces cannot be analyzed outside the historic context of each country and its class confrontations.

Despite the general function of a military machine in the bourgeois state, it would be wrong to consider every uniformed man as its unconditional servant. Accumulated experience indicates the correctness of distinguishing the progressive elements of the armed forces which can be numerous in some countries with the objective of learning the practical possibilities of collaboration for the development of anti-imperialist, democratic and revolutionary struggles.

A correct policy toward the military cannot be based on rigid and exclusive outlines. It must arise from each specific reality and consider all the members of that institution. However, it would not be valid to forget the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism that teach the urgent need to destroy the repressive machinery of the state in order to achieve complete control and replace it with a new state.

Let us stop now to analyze the role that the masses must play. Their incorporation in the revolution to take power and keep it is the only way to

guarantee both things. As we know, though, it is not enough to call to the working class and the rest of the people to overthrow the bourgeoisie. Lenin taught us and experience confirms that propaganda and agitation by themselves are not enough to make the people understand and join revolutionary work. The political experience of the masses is required. That is the basic law of major revolutions.

The problem, then, is to contribute to the experience of the masses and help them develop their revolutionary energy along the most suitable channels in each stage of the development of the class struggle. This cannot be derived merely from the wishes and aspirations of the vanguard.

It is possible for subjectivism to lead the vanguard to replace the role of the masses, precipitate decisive actions by the masses which should be reserved for more opportune moments or--equally negative--philosophically decide to delay actions time and again under the pretext that the masses do not have adequate training to take power.

Recipes and general formulas cannot solve the crucial problem of incorporating the masses to the revolutionary tasks. However, there are useful experiences to consider. For example, the revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada show that the plan of struggle against the dictatorship and for the democracy has the best chance to mobilize the broad popular masses and other allied political forces.

Under the present conditions of the majority of our countries, the decisive element is not to accentuate the final or later objectives of the struggle but to find unifying mottoes directly tied to the circumstances that most restrict the life of the peoples economically, socially and politically.

By turning the main activity of the masses toward the achievement of its anti-dictatorial and democratic aspirations and the solution of its most urgent human problems--employment, health, education, etc.--the possibilities of its action increase and, with them, the potential of the revolutionary movement in the struggle to achieve power and begin the democratic and anti-imperialist stage of the revolution.

The third and last factor--along with unity and the masses--that guarantees the triumph of authentic revolutions is the consistent and timely use of arms. This is not a dogma but the result of the reigning system of domination in the majority of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. The outline of a single continental strategy for such an extensive area that encompasses so many national societies enriched by their own historic struggles and sociological idiosyncrasies would be very ignorant. At the same time, certain principles of every revolution cannot be forgotten.

Arms are indispensable to make any liberating revolution on the continent triumph. They are even more important to preserve its continuity and complete realization.

This statement does not ignore the objective reality of the different countries. In those where far right regimes--almost always fascist military dictatorships--rule, the use of armed struggle or the consistent training of the vanguard in this direction is virtually imperative. In others where democratic ways of life prevail and the vanguards have constitutional channels to carry out their activities, the effectiveness of arms is not shown by their inopportune use but by the psychological preparation and creation of awareness in all militants that a military confrontation will be indispensable at some point in time, in one form or another, even though it is not valid under existing circumstances. It is a matter, then, of creating an attitude in all the revolutionaries and advancing as much as possible in the revolutionary military training of the cadres and militants.

It is also a matter of not subordinating the selection of the armed method to the time when political conditions demand it or to the survival of some democratic forms that compromise the strategic actions of the revolutionary and popular movement.

Lastly, we refer to the need to forge, in the daily class struggle, the conditions that will favor progress along the road to power. This will always require the creation and development of its own military force, in one variant or another and with national forms, to achieve victory.

Occasionally, false dilemmas have been presented concerning the forms of armed and unarmed struggle. A struggle is not reformist merely because it is legal or tries to open democratic ways. Neither is it revolutionary merely because of its armed nature. In our opinion, the revolutionary content of any form of struggle is measured by its results--that is, by the progress or setback that it implies for the ultimate objectives of the popular masses.

The leadership ability of the vanguard rests on its integral preparation to use all forms of struggle that permit it to articulate energetic and timely responses to the different phases of the class struggle. In that sense, the experiences of different revolutionary processes in the area demonstrate that the division of political and military functions--particularly when the resolute and mass use of arms is imposed--leads to the mutilation of both. Therefore, only a political and military strategic concept and the corresponding training and preparation give the vanguards the ability to undertake a new form of struggle based on the stage and situation of each national process.

At times, the necessary use of arms is incorrectly identified with the mechanical application of a certain experience of armed struggle. The revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada have known differences but one of their common ingredients is their distinctive use of arms. There are certain common bases--especially in the revolutions of Cuba and Nicaragua--but there are differences in the military tactics used, in the insurrectional forms, etc. For example, in El Salvador creative revolutionary formulas are being applied in the use of arms supported by a very close tie to the masses and under adverse geographical conditions--the small territory and other factors.

All the revolutions on our continent will have their own characteristics and will undoubtedly offer new contributions to international revolutionary culture. There will not be any outline capable of guiding the national liberation processes and construction of the socialist society on American soil. Each people will make its own revolution and will reach socialism based on the roots of its own national, Latin American and Caribbean history. This will not be a contradiction since every true social revolution is, at the same time, the child of the universal laws discovered by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

In that sense, our commander in chief, Fidel Castro, stated: "The modern revolutionaries owe the immense wealth of their ideas to the theoreticians of scientific socialism: Marx, Engels and Lenin. We can state with absolute conviction that, without them, our people would not have been able to make such a colossal leap in the history of their social and political development. Even with them we would not have been capable of doing this without the productive seed and the unlimited heroism that Marti, Maceo, Gomez, Agramonte, Cespedes and so many giants of our national history sowed in our people and in our spirits.

"That is how the true revolution in Cuba was done, starting with its particular features, its own traditions of struggle and the consistent application of universal principles."*

*F. Castro, speech given at the main ceremony for the 25th anniversary of 26 July, Santiago de Cuba, 26 July 1978, "Discursos" [Speeches], Editora Politica, Havana, 1978, pp 59-60.

7717

CSO: 3248/439

CENTRAL BANK PRESIDENT BONILLA DISCUSSES ECONOMY

San Salvador LA PRENSA GRAFICA in Spanish 22 Dec 82 pp 3, 80

[Text] The central government's deficit was smaller during the current year than in 1981, indicated Alberto Benitez Bonilla, president of the Central Bank, at a reception given for the national press on the occasion of the year-end festivities.

The economist and Central Reserve Bank president also focused on other important aspects, such as the annual production of goods and services, which fell only 5 percent this year. He gave some figures on the distribution of goods and services in relation to overall demand and on price changes in the economy and for the consumer, as well as changes in the price index for exports and imports.

Alberto Benitez Bonilla focused on all those aspects, saying:

"Gentlemen of the public communications media: On the occasion of this Christmas get-together, the Central Bank wishes to thank each and every one of those who directly and indirectly have performed a public service in communicating government action to the public and the various sectors of the country, as well as to the world. Likewise, I avail myself of this occasion to exhort you to continue to fulfill your mission earnestly, culturally, honestly and courageously."

Traditionally at this time, the Central Bank uses this occasion to indicate some of the most important features of past economic development and the course for the immediate future. These salient features are:

1. The annual production of goods and services within the national territory declined only 5 percent during 1982. It should be pointed out that that figure is less than that of 1980 and 1981, 9.5 percent and 9.6 percent, respectively. The value in current colons of the goods and services produced in 1982 will be 9.157 billion colons.
2. The distribution of goods and services in accordance with overall demand, that is, taking into account what is exported and imported, will be the following: personal consumption, 61 percent; government consumption, 11 percent; gross domestic investment, 10 percent; exports, 18 percent.

3. Price changes. The overall price increase in the economy, considering too the effects of external prices through exports and imports, will be 10 percent for the year; that is greater than 1981's 8.5 percent (implicit GNP deflator), mainly as a result of the increase in the price of coffee.

At the beginning of the year, the increase in the consumer price index was projected to be 16 percent; nevertheless, the actual increase will be 12 to 15 percent at the end of the year.

The export price index will be 5 percent and that of imports will be 5.3 percent. The behavior of these indices indicates price stability for all transactions in the economy during 1982.

4. Public finances. During 1982, the public sector was limited to a regime of austerity, which, despite the economic and financial crisis, performed relatively positively. The central government deficit was 602 million colons, a little less than in 1981. It was financed principally through external resources, taking into account that the source of credit for the financial sector was foreign resources. The rest of the nonfinancial public sector showed an improvement relative to expected results.

5. External sector. It showed the following negative balances: 454 million colons in the balance of trade; 323 million colons in the service account; 377 million colons in the current account of the balance of payments. Also, net international reserves will show a net improvement of about 250 million colons at the end of the year, but even so they will continue to show a negative balance. The improvement in the balance in the current account of the balance of payments and in net international reserves is due to the increase in contributions received and greater external financing.

6. Financial sector. The balance of deposits of banks and savings and loan associations will be 3.3 billion colons, an increase of 18 percent over 1981.

The increase in Central Bank loans will exceed 500 million colons, basically supported by external funding sources. Loans by banks and savings and loan associations will be 3.6 billion colons, 14 percent more than the previous year and mainly oriented toward industry, agriculture and construction.

7. Monetary, credit and foreign-exchange policy. During 1982, interest rates increased beginning in February; the rate for 180-day deposits increased from 10 percent to 12.5 percent and the rate for deposits of longer than 180 days was not limited. The interest rate on loans to the productive sectors was raised from 13 to 15 percent, and higher interest rates were established for other classes of loans. The 1982 financial program foresaw credit assistance in accordance with the development of the national product and the expected inflation rate. The result of this program, in accordance with the results indicated before, was satisfactory. In addition, the Monetary Authority provided special financial solutions to the cotton sector and adequate financial solutions to the coffee growers and industrial sector, as well as to the area

of foreign exchange, with the purpose of confronting the problem of the external sector and rationalizing scarce foreign exchange. Several foreign-exchange measures were adopted during the year, both as policy and as administrative measures, which in general produced the expected effects with respect to maintaining acceptable conditions in the midst of the financial crisis afflicting most developing and industrialized countries.

8. Prospects for 1983. The goal will be to achieve at least the same level of production as in 1982 and exports and imports of 1.9 billion and 2.4 billion, respectively. Consequently, one can expect a total deficit of 465 million colons in the current account of the balance of payments.

To cover this deficit, one is now counting on negotiated external financing larger than the said needs, because it is expected that greater attention will be given to the demand for foreign exchange and to continuing to improve the situation with respect to net international reserves.

This credit assistance will come mainly from AID, from Venezuelan and Mexican petroleum financial facilities, from the Central Bank of Argentina, as well as from the IDB, the Central American Bank of Economic Integration, private banks, etc.

9746

CSO: 3248/407

ASI PRESIDENT EDUARDO MENENDEZ ON INDUSTRY CRISIS

San Salvador LA PRENSA GRAFICA in Spanish 28 Dec 82 pp 2,11

[Text] "No one seems to hear the cry for help from those industries that, still in operation, are on the verge of shutting down en masse in the coming months."

That is how Mr Eduardo Menendez, president of the Salvadoran Association of the Industrial Sectors Association [ASI], put it yesterday. For the majority in the private sector, but above all in the public sector, he said, to speak of industrial reactivation means to reactivate the enterprises that have closed in recent months. Thus, there are plans and funds for reopening some enterprises; nevertheless, no one seems to hear the cry for help from those industries still operating which could close en masse in the coming months if not attended to, he indicated.

Although it is true that one must make an effort to reactivate closed enterprises, it is no less important and perhaps more feasible, in the short run, to contribute to reactivating the economy through urgent attention to the industrial enterprises on the verge of closing, indicated the ASI president.

On the occasion of the Fourth Congress of Professionals in the Economic Sciences during last October, he said, the ASI presented a report with respect to the point previously commented on, and "on this occasion I also indicated," he added, "that I would not object to reactivating a single closed industry if the common problems are to be faced, such as the lack of foreign exchange to obtain raw materials and capital goods; adequate financing and refinancing, both in quantity and in term; the lack of markets, especially within the country and in other Central American countries."

For all of these reasons, added the ASI president, the government must intensify its efforts to obtain more aid and credit from public banking and international private banking under favorable conditions and terms. Then he added, it will be necessary to work for unrestrained exporting in the middle and long term to increase the flow of foreign exchange into the country and to define the sort of exchange that is fair and equitable for all exportable products, he said in conclusion.

BRIEFS

VILLALOBOS ON FMLN CONSOLIDATION--Salvadoran guerrilla commander Joaquin Villalobos affirmed that the FMLN has already consolidated its forces into a true army and therefore the fighting has changed in character from an insurrection to a revolutionary war. In an interview with the Cuban weekly BOHEMIA, the rebel leader makes an extensive analysis of the achievements and mistakes of the guerrilla forces in the past year and the experience gained from such actions. Villalobos noted that aside from the military setbacks, the FMLN was able to consolidate and preserve its rear guard and later provide an added impulse to its offensive activities in the cities and other regions of the country; the FMLN was able to take the initiative. He added that during that period, the Salvadoran revolutionary forces succeeded in defeating the offensives launched by the government forces. [Text] [PA221307 Havana International Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 22 Jan 83]

CSO: 3248/445

CIC ADVISOR: TWO PERCENT GDP DROP IN 1983

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 15 Dec 82 pp 4-A, 28-A

[Text] Construction Industry Chamber Council member Jose Mendoza reported yesterday that the gross domestic product will decline almost 2 percent in 1983, which "will very seriously affect employment prospects throughout the country. In addition, it is estimated that the unemployment rate will be 2.9 million Mexicans annually by the end of next year."

As guest speaker at the symposium termed "The Financial Community Faces the Challenges of '83," organized by the Mexican Institute of Financial Managers, Jose Mendoza explained, "We find ourselves facing an economic crisis that is characterized by acute inflation, which will be approximately 90 percent for 1982, a rate that is abnormal in recent decades."

The present situation is the result of a growing fiscal deficit which is now estimated to exceed 16 percent of the gross domestic product and which has been one of the principal factors in a foreign debt of such proportions that servicing of the debt alone now consumes almost all the income from petroleum.

Jose Mendoza of the Construction Industry Chamber Council also said that the shortage of foreign exchange and the drastic reduction in public spending that must be undertaken, along with the high interest rates that affect the entire production and marketing process, have brought us to what is probably the most serious economic recession in modern times.

He warned that "unfortunately, the tendency now evident in the crude oil market appears to indicate a considerable excess in the supply of this product, which could eventually be translated into further reductions in the prices of hydrocarbons."

The most recent revelations lead to the conclusion that there will be a gradual rise in interest rates so that little by little they will approximate the rate of inflation and thus attract savings to the banks, an essential development now, although it will affect the production and marketing process even more, as well as employment prospects.

Regarding the latter, he added, it is expected that there will be almost no growth nationwide for 1982; the figure mentioned is 0.3 percent. A contraction

of 1.5 percent is anticipated for 1983, and it will not be until 1984-85 that employment begins to grow at very modest levels, that is, 0.8 percent and 1.5 percent respectively.

In conclusion, he said that in this regard, "we should realize that although we have succeeded in reducing the population growth rate from 3.7 percent to 2.5 percent annually, this has not yet been reflected in the demand for jobs."

9015

CS0: 3248/411

COMPARATIVE STUDY FOCUSES ON ADMINISTRATION'S ECONOMIC POLICY

Views on Inflation, Employment

Mexico City PROCESO in Spanish 27 Dec 82 pp 12-15

[Article by Carlos Ramirez]

[Text] First came the doubts, then the certainties:

At the hand of an economic stabilization program, on the arm of an unpopular and unjust austerity program, linked to a pact with the International Monetary Fund which guarantees it abroad, and armed with an apocalyptic diagnosis that would justify any measure, the country is embarking on a monetarist counter-revolution that seeks to solve the crisis without regard for the high social costs.

If everything comes out as planned, by 1985 the nation will be on a road cleared of all obstacles; it will not stumble on the same stone again. Those who survive will attest to that. The paradise of economic stability is just around the corner, although a high price may have to be paid.

With its bag of tools that reduce the crisis to a series of variables and statistics than can be controlled, confusing causes with origins, justifying in its reasoning commitments that break away from anti-social decisions, and seeking to modify the structure of the country so that it favors the market more and the state less, economic policy is being set forth in the context of a decalogue of reorganization. The ultimate objective of this decalogue is a monetarist revolt against statist ideas and practices that, according to the new monetarists, are to blame for all evils.

All roads lead to Friedman; the first decisions of President Miguel de la Madrid's government adhere, punctually and precisely, to the monetarist manifesto. The burdens of social conscience, the impacts on the poor, the declarations of populist faith, are, in any case, all part of the scheme of a Mexican-style monetarism. Arnold Harberger (Milton Friedman's associate for Latin America) is already talking about a "hybrid monetarism," that which accepts the existence of a strong state, assimilates the problems of ideologies, and does not shirk some minimal social commitments. But these misfortunes do not modify in the least the objectives of classic monetarism.

After a crisis that has been developing for more than a year and a half, the new administration proposes solutions that can be identified rapidly: control inflation, reduce the red ink in our foreign accounts (balance of payments), and limit the government's actions to its real financial capabilities. In the end, the economy will emerge stabilized, although the price paid by society may be onerous.

Furthermore, the anti-crisis decalogue is not new. In fact, in 1982-83 the measures implemented in 1977-78 (without positive results, even statistically) are being reproduced. In mid-1978 the first evidence was shown of the program that was to alleviate the problems caused in August 1976: cutting public spending, reorienting public and private investment, promoting private investment, combatting inflation (the villain of the crisis), attaining equilibrium in the balance of payments, reducing foreign credits, freezing wages, liquidating para-state enterprises, reorganizing the government apparatus, deregulating and raising prices, and making agreements with the IMF.

At that time as well, the language of realism was spoken; today it has been revived in even greater strength. The remedies of the past are being prescribed today, with a stronger dose. Thus, at a crisis pace with chain-reaction disruptions, monetarism is bringing back drastic medicine, the only remedy for the crisis, social and popular commitments notwithstanding. In view of an economic crisis that has already become a social crisis, the diagnosis characterizes the crisis as an internal imbalance (inflation), an external imbalance (balance of payments), and excess statism.

And the new government is taking aim at those elements.

The arrival of monetarism in economic policy is the result of the training of the new officials in this area (see box). Although it is denied in public and rejected insistently, the measures taken by this administration are identical to the premises of the monetarist manifesto. We need only compare the government's recent decisions with the Friedman decalogue to clarify its intentions; we need only compare that relationship with the ideas that from 1936 until the present--from Keynes to the contemporary search for solutions that will not strip the economy of its social commitments--have thwarted the true intentions of monetarism: to return society to the days of the free market, of laissez-faire.

The monetarist counter-revolution is underway. The inevitable nature of the crisis and the pain involved in its solutions provide the justification:

Inflation

Monetarism: It is caused by monetary factors. Controlling the money supply reduces inflation: shrink the money supply, hold down demand, have faith in the automatic adjustments of the market to find the proper level of prices. Government intervention causes more problems than solutions. Increasing public spending accelerates inflation and leads to unemployment. Cutting the fiscal deficit and reducing the amount of money in circulation controls

inflation. There is an "invisible hand" that controls the market, that regulates it without state intervention. All supply creates its own demand and price stability. The money supply should grow at the same rate as the economy.

Anti-monetarism: It is not the money supply that leads to inflation, but a drop in the profit rate. The origin of the increase in prices can be found in the class struggle over the distribution of wealth. Lowering wages does not guarantee an increase in consumption; on the contrary, modulating demand reduces consumption, and recession is created as a drastic measure to bring down prices. Rather than reducing demand, supply should be increased through government investments.

President De la Madrid's Program: Contain demand in order to prevent upward pressure on prices. Reduce the money supply, depress real wages to make investment and the expansion of supply attractive. Shore up supply and modulate demand. Cut back on price controls so that prices will adjust automatically on the free market. Absorb liquidity--withdraw money from circulation--through interest rates and government papers. Make profits attractive in order to promote investment, diminish public spending, as it is considered inflationary; spend what we have, not what we don't have.

Savings-Investment

Monetarism: Raise interest rates to promote savings. Savings is investment. Use the "natural rate of unemployment" and high prices as a stimulus for investment. All abstinence from consumption is savings that will then be converted into investment, automatically. The function of central banking institutions is to stimulate savings and investment on the basis of automatic and not discretionary rules.

Anti-monetarism: Savings is not automatic investment. Moreover, interest rates do not stimulate investment. There is no need for the savings of the rich classes, because that is money that is not invested. Sometimes savings and interest rates discourage investment. In a free market, an increase in the income of society can lead to more savings without an automatic growth in investment. A point is reached at which savings rise but the interest rate does not stimulate productive investment. Thus, the interest rate causes problems, and if it is too high it curbs investments and does not stimulate employment.

De la Madrid Program: Increase interest rates to stimulate savings. Lower public spending to generate public savings. Use credit to stimulate investment.

Government

Monetarism: The Leviathan State is to blame for all evils. Its intervention in the economy should be limited to its capacity to finance its spending healthily, without putting too much money into circulation and without expanding the fiscal burden. Employment should not be created, nor should fiscal

and monetary policy be used to create jobs. Spending should be balanced. The market will resolve its contradictions by itself. Its function should be to protect freedom, enforce private contracts and foster competitive markets.

Anti-monetarists: Government investment stimulates production by expanding collective demand, in addition to creating jobs. Its function is to socialize investment. State intervention in the thirties helped solve the great depression and "primed the pump" in a crisis of enormous dimensions. Its role is economic and social; it prevents and curbs exploitation, regulates markets and intervenes so that laissez-faire will not have social costs.

De la Madrid Program: Cut public spending. Budget what can be covered with the government's own, healthy revenues, without expanding the money supply, without raising direct taxes on capital but with increased taxes on consumption, and without raising the foreign public debt. Regulation is advocated, but as a function of the monetarist trend within the government. Thus, regulation will respond to economic considerations, not social ones. The para-state enterprises would be given a shot in the arm, at the cost of increasing prices and hitting the lower classes hard. Bureaucrats would be discharged, since those jobs should be given to the private sector. Current spending (wages, salaries, administration) would be cut. The government should not create fictitious demand, which exerts pressure elsewhere and is inflationary.

Employment

Monetarism: Employment is a consequence of economic activity, not its central objective. The "natural rate of unemployment" encourages investment and creates work. Unemployment stems from high wages. Low wages stimulate the creation of jobs.

Anti-monetarism: Insufficiency of collective demand is what keeps supply, investment and employment at low levels. The employment rate and overall revenues are determined by the level of investment and the propensity to consume. Unemployment is indicative of an inequitable distribution of wealth. With high savings and low investment, the state should deliberately encourage investment and the creation of jobs.

De la Madrid Program: Only productive employment will be protected. The internal imbalances of the economy must be corrected in order to stimulate the creation of employment. There is not enough savings to finance investment, and that is why there is not widespread employment. The "natural rate of unemployment" will encourage investment. Keeping down real wages will facilitate investment and make it less costly. Unemployment will be increased to permit competition to stimulate the low costs of investment. The interest rate and savings will promote employment.

Fiscal Policy

Monetarism: Fiscal policy should not aim at an increase in government revenues in order to expanding spending. The function of taxes is not to redistribute wealth but to finance the indispensable expenses of the government.

More indirect taxes (on consumption) and fewer taxes on capital; otherwise, investment is depressed.

Anti-monetarist: Fiscal policy has several objectives: to expand the government's revenues, stimulate investment, redistribute income and mitigate the impacts of the crisis on the most vulnerable social sectors.

De la Madrid Program: Fiscal reform boiled down to higher taxes on consumption and few taxes on capital. Income is not distributed. Indirect taxes go up, the value added tax (VAT) climbs. Forty-four percent of the government's fiscal revenues come from the VAT, 31 percent from the income tax (ISR). Between 1982 and 1983 the VAT will grow 204 percent, the ISR only 36 percent. In 1982 the VAT was 62 percent of the ISR. In 1983 the ISR is only 71 percent of the VAT. Consumers will bear the brunt of the government's fiscal reform. By not touching income, investment is stimulated.

Balance of Payments

Monetarism: The imbalance in the current account of the balance of payments is at all times and places a monetary phenomenon. If the monetary portion is modulated, the imbalance will be corrected automatically. As a consequence, the balance of payments should be stabilized, and on that basis all items for expenditure and revenues that affect the results should be adjusted. If the deficit stems from a trade imbalance, exports must be increased and imports decreased. If there is a lack of foreign currency income, foreign investment must be encouraged.

Anti-monetarism: The red ink in the national foreign accounts is a reflection of structural imbalances in the economy.

De la Madrid Program: Limit the balance of payments deficit to a certain amount, and from there, each budgetary item that causes pressure must be corrected. More exports, fewer imports, more foreign investment, competition by this country on the international market.

Furthermore, other decisions involve a monetarist orientation: the denationalization of the banks, the business functions--efficiency and effectiveness--of the financial system, the liberalization of the exchange rate, and the automatic regulation of the market through the supply and demand of dollars. In fact, society's aspirations for equity and its demands for justice are placed just under economic stability.

Nonetheless, the contradictions are obvious. While inflation is supposed to be controlled on the demand side, high interest rates stimulate it while creating a recession. We are entering a recessionary period with high prices (stagflation).

The increase in prices and the tax hikes discourage consumption, and that reduces demand, which in turn curbs investment. The latter, in turn, accelerates unemployment, which dampens demand. The vicious circle will have to be broken, and government intervention will be necessary for that.

In her time, Joan Robinson spoke of monetarist objectives: "If they only established free trade, restored the gold standard, balanced the budget and let the free play of the market forces establish equilibrium, everything would be for the better, in the best of all possible worlds."

Basically, monetarist thought in Mexico is experiencing a model of development that aims at correcting the external and internal imbalances, at the cost of a modification in the country's economic and social consensus. Thus, the structuralism of the monetarists is based on an economic counter-revolution that will strip the state of its social and political role, and will leave it in a healthy economic entity, in the middle of a society with an unjust distribution of wealth.

Background Sketches of Planners

Mexico City PROCESO in Spanish 27 Dec 82 pp 12-15

[Article by Carlos Ramirez]

[Text] From all corners and suburbs of the nation, the Mexican monetarists are beginning to emerge into the limelight, and are taking up the reins of economic policy with the conviction that now the country will finally be able to resolve its great problems. The adjustment program, which seeks stability without development, which places the burden of recovery on the shoulders of the most vulnerable majority sectors, and which lacks the social and political sensibility to prorate costs, finds in these people its ideologues and its passionate defenders.

There are solutions now, they say, as they refine their ideas and theories while settling in to high-level positions. The monetarists are happy that they are taking over the principal levels of government. This is, in fact, the first generation of economists educated abroad, at universities where economics is considered a classical subject, where studies cover Milton Friedman but do not overlook John Maynard Keynes or Latin American structuralism. This group is coming to power and taking over, expelling other economists with statist, Keynesian ideas, ideas that are simply more open.

This generation has several characteristics in common: their view of economic problems, their apprenticeship as Friedman's star pupils, their studies in other schools with similar ideas. But above all, the common thread is the Autonomous Technicological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), our domestic Chicago School, which is frequently visited--as if it were his own home--by Arnold Harberger, Friedman's associate for Latin America, on the insistent invitation of ITAM or of Guillermo Prieto Fortun, confirmed undersecretary of the treasury.

There seems to be no place to which the monetarists do not have access. They have friends, acquaintances, and colleagues to follow. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, secretary of programming and budget, was a respected teacher at ITAM. His brilliant and rigid thought is remembered as coinciding with the general ideas of monetarism.

Other officials did not go to ITAM but did partake of the ideas of classic economics, those which jumped over Keynes and came alive with Friedman. At the same level, Horacio Garcia Aguilar, secretary of agriculture and hydraulic resources, comes from the group of the old Bank of Mexico, when that institution was the tool used by private bankers to sabotage economic policy and orient it toward the interests of private financiers. At the meetings, at the head of FIRA [expansion unknown] (the rural support agency affiliated with the World Bank), Garcia Aguilar evaluated the viability of projects as a function of subsidies. If there were subsidies, the project did not work.

The same ideas, the same approaches, are characteristic of other officials. Jesus Silva Herzog, secretary of the treasury, felt that the way out of the crisis was for the government to retreat, regardless of its social commitments. In April, his first anti-crisis program--which became even more radical later on--was termed monetarist, orthodox, a veritable shock treatment; it is tamer than what is being applied at present. In real terms, that program caused nothing but trouble for the masses that earn the minimum wage and less, although afterwards that shock program was cleaned up and presented in December in a more drastic form.

The same goes for Hector Hernandez Cervantes, secretary of commerce, and Francisco Labastida Ochoa, secretary of patrimony. Both use monetarist tools. The former insists on applying Friedman's theories to solve the balance of payments deficit, by opening the country up to indiscriminate foreign investment and bringing Mexico into GATT.

At that same top level, Miguel Mancera Aguayo, director of the Bank of Mexico, makes a special case. He shows clear monetarist tendencies, is militant and combative. He objected to any government decision to eliminate speculation with foreign currency, even if the economy lost control. In September he was bypassed, so that fundamental decisions could be made to correct what he was unable to control during the March-August period. Nonetheless, he was reinstated in December, to dismantle the decrees of the Sixth Report, and to make the Bank of Mexico once again the principal lair of monetarism in government.

With the top-level positions assured, adherents of this school of thought went on to occupy the lower levels. The new stabilizers are now taking control of economic policy after many reports, attacks and humiliations. They will implement this policy without fear, with enthusiasm. One fact stands out: to close the circle, the monetarists defused the possible opposition of the Chamber of Deputies. Manuel Cavazos Lerma, a former student of Friedman's, a monetarist who would like to forget his active participation in classic and orthodox economics, and a noted teacher at ITAM, is chairman of the Chamber's Finance Committee. Trained at the Bank of Mexico's finance school, during its brilliant period as an auxiliary tool in the implementation of stabilizing development, Cavazos Lerma was an avowed and devoted monetarist. Afterwards, especially when he became active in politics when Miguel de la Madrid began his campaign, he exorcized his past as a "Chicago boy." His essay published in the book "Cincuenta anos de Banca

Central" [Fifty Years of Central Banking] in 1976 remains as evidence, however:

After justifying the brilliant contribution of stabilizing development to the Mexican economy, Cavazos Lerma says: "It has been observed that 'greater monetary discipline' (which confirms the Friedman doctrine that economic problems are at all times and places a monetary phenomenon, and therefore if the money supply is controlled crises can be avoided) entails a greater contribution by monetary policy to the achievement of the principal objectives of an economic policy that advocates a better distribution of income, dynamic economic growth, and the generation of savings and jobs through the preservation, to the greatest extent possible, of the internal and external buying power of the currency."

He also says that although there is doubt about our experience in this regard, "the facts have always served to demolish hypotheses that did not apply to our country," rejecting any search for paths other than monetarism.

Furthermore, monetarists are beginning to have more responsibility for the conception, design and application of economic policy. The list includes well-known names, and is becoming longer as appointments are made at the various levels of finance and treasury activities in public administration:

Alfredo Phillips Olmedo comes from the Bank of Mexico group and today is director of the National Bank of Foreign Commerce. Less radical than the others, his monetarism is, however, intellectual, carefully thought out and overt.

Gustavo Petricioli, now director of the National Financial Bank, has established ties with monetarists in recent years, especially as president of the Banking Commission.

Ernesto Fernandez Hurtado was director of the Bank of Mexico during Luis Echeverria's administration. A prudent, elegant, conservative man, Fernandez Hurtado was not ashamed to leave the public sector and go to the private sector. He was director of the nationalized BCH Bank, which he helped transform into a mixed bank. As coordinator of the book marking the Bank of Mexico's fiftieth anniversary, Fernandez Hurtado wrote a long essay expressing his monetarist convictions. He says in one part:

"To raise the standard of living at the necessary pace, which is only possible by maintaining high levels of productive investment and employment, developing countries must constantly adjust their monetary and fiscal regulatory policies, as dictated by the monetarist manifesto, in view of the need to promote a greater generation and internal amassment of public and private savings." Here monetary mechanisms are given priority, subordinating the objectives of justice and equity to monetary results.

Francisco Gil Diaz, a former Friedman student, is back on his own turf. After several years in a lower-level position at Treasury, he is now in charge of economic studies at the Bank of Mexico. His function will be to

conduct studies to contribute to monetary decision-making. An advocate of less government and more free market, Gil Diaz has left few written testimonials of his thoughts. However, his students at ITAM remember him for his monetarist convictions. In an essay published in the aforementioned book on the Bank of Mexico, Gil Diaz wrote an article in which he defines his ideas rigidly:

"It is said that monetary policy should promote employment, redistribute income, stabilize prices, control the current account deficit of the balance of payments, and keep interest rates low in order to encourage production." He does not feel this is so: "It appears that monetary policy is more effective and can better achieve the countless objectives set forth, to the extent that it prevents its effects from being destabilizing (such as the employment, income, price and balance of payments objectives). That is, the positive aspect of monetary policy lies in preventing its effects from being negative, not in trying to achieve a series of economic goals through it. The principle of shortage in economics states that when objectives are independent of each other, an instrument should be assigned to a single objective." Thus, monetary policy should function to regulate the currency, and that is all.

His conclusion is interesting: "This work (entitled "Politica monetaria y fiscal" [Monetary and Fiscal Policy]) suggests that a relatively harmonious growth of monetary and fiscal amounts should be planned around the economy's growth trends." Perhaps this justifies the current policy of modulating the money supply to the pace of the economy and of deactivating any fiscal reform that would discourage investment.

Other names are added to the list:

Enrique Creel de la Barra, who has family interests in several private banks, will take over Banobras.

Rogelio Moran, financial director of Channel 13, is remembered at ITAM as a combative monetarist who opposed statist Keynesianism.

Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma, director of Somex, came to monetarism late. However, during his short stay at the Secretariat of the Treasury--between December 1976 and November 1977--he implemented the stabilizing ideas of the International Monetary Fund in national economic policy. His inflexibility put him at loggerheads with Carlos Tello.

Mario Ramon Beteta, today director of Mexican Petroleum, went from mixed banking to the number-one para-state enterprise in the nation. His function at Somex was that of a private banker, and he launched Somex headlong into the speculation in 1982 that sent the peso into a tailspin. Similarly, when the banks were nationalized, government investigators found an interesting clue in Beteta's ownership of the Banco Continental. After the nationalization, Beteta proposed mixed banking as a solution, and advocated returning the shares to businessmen.

Francisco Suarez, of the Bank of Mexico group, is undersecretary of the treasury. His membership in the select team of financiers at the Bank of Mexico makes him an active participant in the group of monetarists who have dominated that institution since the sixties.

Luis Bravo Aguilera, now undersecretary of foreign trade, belongs to the groups that practice economic conservatism. He is a member of the Hector Hernandez group, and has always said that Mexico should join GATT.

Rogelio Montemayor, a distinguished teacher at ITAM, is undersecretary of planning.

Marcela Gonzalez Salas, a top official of the Secretariat of Programming and Budget (SPP), is a teacher and alumna of ITAM, and follows hard-line monetarism.

Pedro Aspe, now coordinator of general geographic, statistical and information services at SPP, was director of economics at ITAM. A flexible monetarist, he takes pride in the fact that he did his doctoral thesis at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and that he wrote it with a member of the Italian Communist Party.

Jesus Reyes Heróles Gonzalez, an ITAM alumnus, also went to MIT. Flexible in his ideas, his thesis was advised by Francisco Gil Diaz, and he won a prize in economics. Today he is director of treasury planning at the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP).

Gilberto Escobedo, assistant director of Somex, comes from the same group as Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma at Treasury, but he is noted for his monetarist tendencies.

Manuel Suarez Mier, a former student of Friedman's, is now assistant director for studies at Mexican Petroleum.

Abel Garrido, of Hector Hernandez' group, was the right-hand man of the negotiator who wanted the country to sign up with GATT. He was confirmed as director of international negotiations at the Secretariat of Commerce.

Agustin Lopez Mungia was formerly assistant director general of the old Bank of Mexico, when the latter served the interests of bankers. Today he is a top official at the Secretariat of Commerce.

The list gets longer as people call on others who share their ideas. It is noteworthy that the aim is to form a monolithic administration with a single voice, without granting access to anyone who does not share the same ideas, theories and propositions.

The circle is completed with the inclusion of businessmen in the administration. For example, Manuel Sosa de la Vega has returned as director of Mexicana de Aviacion, a post he left when the previous administration acquired the enterprise because it was on the verge of bankruptcy. With

government backing, and as a high-level bureaucrat, Sosa de la Vega, a prosperous businessman, will not have to worry about the liabilities in dollars that he might have been able to cancel for the institution.

Francisco Cano Escalante, who went from Concanaco to the government 12 years ago, returns to an important post: undersecretary of provisions, where he will put into practice the experience he acquired as leader of the merchants in that sector during the turbulent years of the Echeverria administration.

Ricardo Garcia Sainz, today at the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS), comes from a management background. From the IP [expansion unknown] he went to the public sector, and became an interim secretary of programming and budget.

Arsenio Farell Cubillas, today secretary of labor, was director of the Business Center of Guadalajara. His first pronouncements in recent weeks have been in opposition to workers' demands for wage increases, in the face of overwhelming inflation.

Jose Campillo Sainz is once again at the Institute of the National Fund for Workers Housing (INFONAVIT). In the late sixties, he headed the Confederation of Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN) there. Under Echeverria he was secretary of industry and commerce.

Guillermo Prieto Fortun, a businessman from the automotive sector, joined the Undersecretariat of Revenues during the previous administration, and is still there today.

Hector Vazquez Tercero, today director of import controls for manufactured goods, is a prominent economist from the private sector.

Victor Garcia Lizama, who has been a distinguished member of the private sector, has also been a public servant for the past few years. In the present administration he has been named coordinator of the Liquidating Trust of Credit Institutions.

Alfredo Luengas, formerly a private banker whose bank was nationalized on 1 September, is now president of the National Banking and Insurance Commission.

Looked at as a whole, the coherence and uniformity of thought of the present government economic team tips the scale toward one side, the only counterweight being the flexibility of some officials, never the contraposition of ideas, the confrontation of viewpoints. Without dams or diversions of any sort, the route the country is following will have no path of retreat. This, in reality, is a one-for-all, all-for-one team.

8926

CSO: 3248/417

SNTE SECTION 36 ELECTS NEW SECRETARY GENERAL

CCL Protest

Mexico City UNOSMASUNO in Spanish 17 Dec 82 pp 7

[Article by Rosa Rojas: "Mexican Valley CCL Supports Negotiated Solution"]

[Text] At the conclusion of the work of the second Special Sectional Convention of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) Section 36, accomplished during a single session lasting from 4:30pm Wednesday to 5:00am Thursday, the 326 representatives "akin to the union" who took part in the session elected Dionisio Moreno Cortes as the new general secretary of the section. The Central Council for the Teachers' Struggle (CCL) of the valley of Mexico pointed out that in spite of the fraudulent meetings and convention held by the Revolutionary Vanguard, it agrees to try to reach a negotiated settlement, warning that it will never surrender, inasmuch as it is struggling not for union jobs but to win back the union, its democracy and its independence.

The CCL denied the statements made by the SNTE leader Ramon Martinez Martin to the effect that the dissident teachers were invited to take part in this convention, and pointed out that at no time did the boorish leaders of the SNTE respect the dictates of the agreement, signed on 2 April, to form a bipartisan joint commission that would undertake the work of the organization. "We were offered [the opportunity] to be parties to the delegational assemblies, but not even this did they formalize in writing," [the CCL stated] and asserted that the work of the joint commission was not merely to send one teacher to oversee the meetings but much more, which was detailed in a document to which they never received a response.

The CCL emphasized and reiterated its assertion that it has the backing of the majority of the SNTE Section 36 and that the only thing lacking in order to demonstrate this is to hold a democratic convention. It questioned why, if the SNTE has a majority, are they afraid of a democratic convention, why do they hold a fraudulent convention?

It affirmed also that there are other forces that reject the Revolutionary Vanguard, which in a democratic convention would support the CCL.

Regarding the accusations of violence that the leaders of the SNTE have hurled against the members of the CCL, the dissident teachers talked of the murder of the democratic leader Misael Nunez Acosta, of the abduction of Ezequiel Reyes Carrillo, also a director, of the fact that Elba Esther Gordillo, of SNTE's CEN [National Executive Committee] abducted officials of the SEP [Secretariat of Public Education] in the State of Mexico because they did not help her political campaign, and has threatened the directors of the CCL, affirming that the democratic teachers only defend themselves against aggression by boors.

They pointed out that the convention should be put off until an understanding is reached between the two factions and affirmed that they do not want the destruction of the Revolutionary Vanguard accomplished via a massacre of dissident teachers. "We prefer a negotiated settlement to a confrontation."

Later on they indicated that the Ministry of Government is obligated to straighten out the national directorship of the Revolutionary Vanguard accomplished via a massacre of dissident teachers. "We prefer a negotiated settlement to a confrontation."

Later on they indicated that the Ministry of Government is obligated to straighten out the national directorship of the Revolutionary Vanguard.

Moreno Cortez Interviewed

Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish 20 Dec 82 p 3

[Text] Dionisio Moreno Cortes, a militant in the Teachers Revolutionary Vanguard, pointed out less than a week after having

been elected general secretary of the SNTE [National Union of Education Workers] Section 36, that political bosses are "inherent to this system because of the characteristics of same and the [way] the state is organized."

For the new director of one of the sections most opposed by the teachers" dissident group, the decentralization of the educational system--announced on 1 December by the president of the republic--"is not in agreement with what the third article of the constitution states," but he agreed that the terms under which this measure will operate are not yet known.

The elevation of Dionisio Moreno to this union post took place on the previous Wednesday and Thursday during the second special convention of SNTE's Section 36, which was held in a movie house in the state of Mexico as well as in a club house in Acozac, ceremonies that were protected by members of the police force. Nonetheless, the new director professed not to know who asked for or ordered such action. The police force was not there--he pointed out--"for the inauguration. This was incidental."

During the same interview the director of the section talked about Misael Nunez Acosta--murdered dissident teacher--and Carlos Jonguitud Barrios. He considered the image of the president for life of the Teachers Revolutionary Vanguard as "positive". Nonetheless, he pointed out "it is not my job" to define the image the country may have of the same person, since Nunez Acosta "was a symbol" but "I believe that has worn thin."

While talking of the political bosses he indicated that "at a historic moment these are necessary (sic) because social retention demands leadership, and political bossism in any social arena cannot happen without leadership." And he added:

"Vanguard as an ideological trend is strong. I predict that because of its principles it will last a long time. The fact that it faces opposition does not mean that it is in decadence."

Regarding his election as general secretary of SNTE Section 36, he said that the second special convention of that section expressed "overwhelmingly" its endorsement of the ballot he was heading, and "we have already heard its approval. We are much encouraged."

Besides, he pointed out, SNTE's national convention, to be held next January, "is assured for Vanguard."

He believed that the preceding sectional executive committee--also from Vanguard--achieved "extraordinary progress" for the teachers of Section 36, which comprises a total of 34,000 education workers from the Valley of Mexico.

Dionisio Moreno was also of the opinion that education in Mexico "needs to be revised," and he pointed out as problems in this process the inoperative administrative structure of the educational system, for "the mistakes are evident."

He said that the decentralization of the SEP [Secretariat of Public Education] is "necessary and healthy," but added that "it does not favor us teachers." This measure has broad implications, such as budgetary matters, he said, and is not in agreement with the third constitutional article.

In the end, he censured the dissident teachers for "the manner in which they used the image of Misael Nunez Acosta as a tool for sensitization, in order to gain more initiates."

9907

CSO: 3248/403

CCLMM PROTESTS CUERNAVACA MANEUVERS BY JONGUITUD

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 16 Dec 82 pp 4-A, 27-A

[Text] Teachers of the Central Council for the Morelos Teachers' Struggle (CCLMM) held a meeting at the town square yesterday in which they accused the governor of San Luis Potosi and leader of the Revolutionary Vanguard of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE), Carlos Jonguitud Barrios, of sending a group of armed agitators to that city in order to prevent "democratic" professors from participating in the Special State Convention.

The teachers, who came from Cuautla and Cocoyoc, met yesterday in the center of Cuernavaca in order to publicly denounce the unlawful actions of the governor of San Luis Potosi, Carlos Jonguitud Barrios, and those of the present national leader of the SNTE, Ramon Martinez Martin.

Victor Ariel Barcenias, director of the CCLM, said that several individuals armed with guns prevented the teachers of that "democratic" group of the SNTE from attending the opening of the Special State Convention held at the Roble movie house in the city of Cuautla.

Santiago Flores Saucedo, the local representative, and Alvaro Rito, secretary of finance of the SNTE, representing Ramon Martinez Martin, presided over the meeting, where according to Victor Ariel Barcenias, an attempt was made to impose the continuity of political bossism.

The riot troops were hired by the governor of San Luis Potosi, Carlos Jonguitud Barrios, declared Victor Ariel Barcenias, who asked the CCLMM teachers to remain calm and not to react to the violence.

Alfredo Ibarra Bobadila, the correspondent in Cuernavaca, reported that in an auditorium in Cocoyoc several individuals armed with guns and cattle prods prevented members of the CCLMM from attending the meeting.

Cesar Uscanga Uscanga, representative from the Ministry of Public Education in the locality, said to the representative of this newspaper, Alfredo Ibarra, that the celebration of the convention was prejudicial to over 300,000 pre-elementary and elementary school pupils when classes were suspended yesterday.

He added that among the two opposing groups there are activists who take advantage of the internal problems of the SNTE.

9907

CSO: 3248/403

PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF JLP QUASHED

Mexico City PROCESO in Spanish 20 Dec 83 pp 29-30

[Text] The Priist majority in the Chamber of Deputies on Friday, the 17th, rejected a proposal by the National Action Party (PAN) to form a special multi-party commission to investigate the presumed use of government resources in building four residences in the Cuajimalpa Delegation area, property which belongs to former President Jose Lopez Portillo.

Deputy Florentina Villalobos de Pineda, on behalf of the parliamentary faction of PAN, made the proposal "by virtue of the existence of ample and wide journalistic-type accusations imputing to the former president of the Republic, Mr Jose Lopez Portillo, of holding vast properties in the Cuajimalpa Delegation."

She added that it has been reported that in that area highways, overpasses, gardens and city services have been constructed, works "which, it is said, were paid for and done by several government agencies for the benefit of the former president," for which "it is inexcusable that this national representation (the Chamber) undertake an investigation of the aforesaid accusation."

Deputy Villalobos de Pineda said that accusations made by the news media on the "shameful, unexplainable enrichment of government officials and, above all, which put emphasis especially on the enrichment of the former president of the republic" have not been denied.

PAN's proposal was backed by parliamentary factions from PSUM [Unified Socialist Party of Mexico] and PDM [Mexican Democratic Party], but the Priist majority rejected it immediately.

9908

CSO: 3248/416

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 23 Dec 82 p 5-A

[Article by Humberto Aranda]

[Text] Of the 1 million workers who normally work in the construction industry, 900,000 are out of a job as of the end of this year, reported Ignacio Guerra, secretary general of the Union of Construction, Excavation and Related Workers of the Republic of Mexico.

He added that at this time there is no expectation that activities in this industry will become normalized soon, given the restriction of public spending that the federal government intends to impose.

One indication of the construction crisis, he said, is the fact that drafting work has become totally paralyzed.

The principal drafting firms, such as ICA, Ballesteros and Bufete Industrial, have readjusted most of their personnel, retaining only indispensable employees, who are paid while not working.

Bufete Industrial, for example, cut its payroll from 2,500 to 850 employees.

Guerra indicated that the problem was analyzed last week at a meeting of construction union secretaries general, who were pessimistic about the immediate future of the industry.

The only major project the federal government has underway is the second stage of Las Truchas, and it only employs 3,500 workers. Other private projects throughout the country are employing very few people.

The crisis, according to the labor leader, is also affecting the industries that supply construction materials, such as iron and steel, glass and cement.

However, he asserted that the situation is no cause for alarm, since they have an extensive foreign market for their products while the national economic and financial woes are being dealt with.

8926

CSO: 3248/417

TRADE UNIONIST TELLS OF MISUSED GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 17 Dec 82 p 7-D

[Article by Rogelio Freyre]

[Text] Tierra Blanca, Veracruz, 16 Dec--Farm equipment, valued at 2 billion pesos, remains unclaimed on property belonging to this municipality while farmers need farm implements in order to cultivate their lands and to get greater yields.

Juan Manuel Rivas Luna, a National Field Workers Union member, explained that tractors, mowers and other machinery belong to Ejido Lands Services which is under SARH [Secretariat of Agriculture and Water Resources].

He stated that a few tractors in good condition are used only for working the lands which belong to federal, state and municipal officials.

He indicated that 15 tractors acquired this year by Ejido Lands Services remain abandoned and in bad shape due to lack of maintenance. Of these units, he clearly stated, only 10 pieces of equipment were usable during a few weeks, the rest did not operate.

In spite of the accusations concerning this irregularity, the authorities, he said, have not intervened and the equipment is being damaged each day until it is of no use.

Rivas Luna said the farmers here have never had access to the use of this farm machinery, because the Ejido Lands Services asks them for half the advance payment for doing raking and plowing.

"Irresponsible officials," he said, "are the causes for the equipment, valued at 2 billion pesos, going to waste in this municipality while farmers need implements."

9908

CSO:3248/416

AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY COSTS NEARLY DOUBLED IN 1982

Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish 19 Dec 82 p 9

[Article by Ricardo Muro]

[Text] Prices of agricultural supplies--pesticides, fertilizers, seeds, fuel, tractors, transportation, etc.--have increased on the average by 100 percent this year, a factor which has had a negative effect on farm production, made operations uneconomical and threatened to lower production still further in 1983.

In view of this wave of inflation, which has outdistanced increases in the guaranteed prices of basic crops, set by the government in 1982, producers, both cooperative and small owners, are asking for an emergency increase in guaranteed prices and permission to participate in setting the increases.

The National Executive Committee of the National Farm Confederation (CNC), headed by Deputy Victor Cevera Pacheco, met yesterday with the secretary of agriculture and water resources, Horacio Garcia Aguilar, to request a permanent revision of the guaranteed prices for basic products.

The CNC delegation pointed out that "producers have been affected by the increases in the cost of production stemming from price increases for diesel fuel and electricity."

At the same time the coordinator of farm matters of the Employers Confederation of the Mexican Republic (COPARMEX), Hector Lugo, indicated that prices have increased for fertilizers, seeds, pesticides and other agricultural supplies this year.

The COPARMEX representative demanded that producers be permitted to participate in the Committee To Set Guaranteed Prices since they are now set by the farm cabinet and the producers "only have the right to voice their opinions but not to vote."

To give an idea of the unfavorable relation between supply costs and the guaranteed prices, there follows a list of increases that have occurred in both areas during 1982.

The guaranteed price for corn at the end of last year was 6,550 pesos a ton; the present price is 8,850 pesos, which is an increase of 35 percent.

The guaranteed price for wheat in August 1981 was 4,700 pesos a ton; at present, the price is 6,930, an increase of 47 percent.

The price for sorghum rose 32 percent in the last 12 months; the guaranteed price in 1981 was 3,930 pesos a ton and is now 5,200 pesos a ton.

In contrast, increases in supply costs, as shown below, were greater:

The increase in the cost of manual labor during the past 10 months was 82 percent, reflecting the change in the minimum wage in the central region of the country from 160 pesos, to the present rate of 292.50 pesos.

The increase in the cost of fuel, which makes up a significant percentage of agricultural costs, was 257 percent for gasoline, while for diesel fuel it was 240 percent.

There was an increase of 140 percent in the cost of lubricants this year.

Two of the most widely used fertilizers in agriculture are superphosphate of calcium and ammonia sulfate. These and other formulas containing additional elements have suffered a price increase of 60 percent.

The following data on insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides are revealing: Lannate increased from 991.60 pesos per kg to 1,942.80 pesos, or 86 percent.

Gesagard 50 herbicide rose from 348.10 pesos to 653.50 pesos, or 88 percent. In fungicides, Manzate D cost 131.10 pesos less than a year ago, but now costs 209.65 pesos, which is 60 percent above the former price.

There was also a considerable increase in the cost of vehicles and farm equipment this year. For example, a truck weighing 24,500 pounds increased by 56 percent and the price of 70-75 horsepower tractors has increased between 54 and 60 percent in the last 10 months.

In addition, the cost of imported hybrid seeds increased almost 200 percent as a result of the recent devaluations of the Mexican peso.

The devaluation also affected imports of breeding cattle and other supplies, such as medicines and embryos.

Alberto Salinas, a leader of the Federation of Agricultural Organizations (FEDEMOA), stated that at the same time there had also been considerable increases in the cost of transporting farm products, and this has adversely affected farm production costs.

Hector Lugo said that "inflation had hit producers very hard," and he indicated that the increases ordered by the farm cabinet for guaranteed prices of farm products have not come at the same rate as the increases in supply costs. Finally, he said that his inflationary process "could have negative effect on agricultural production throughout the country since the farmer will be forced to plant less."

MINIMUM WAGE SAID DENIED TO GUANAJUATO RURAL LABORERS

Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 16 Dec 82 p 7

[Text] In the state of Guanajuato no agricultural laborer receives the minimum wage for his work, nor does he have the seventh day for rest. He does not have a work schedule, and neither can he count on allowances set forth by law, such as medical insurance and housing.

This lamentable situation experienced by agricultural workers in Guanajuato was commented on by Jaime Quintana, delegate of Union Action in this state, under the National Peasant Confederation [CNC]. He indicated that the minimum wage established for this entity is 150 pesos a day, a sum that no rural worker receives.

That is the case for the peasants who work for Mr Urquiza, who has 90 laborers on more than 90 hectares working under deplorable conditions; many of them have been plantation workers for several years and eight of them were dismissed because they are now old and do not produce the required amount.

The laborers went to the Conciliation and Arbitration Board in Celaya to present their demands; 2 months after losing their jobs they were told that they were going to require the employer to give them back their jobs or compensate them. Nevertheless, on being confronted with Mr Urquiza's lawyers, the officials of the mentioned board changed their opinion and sent the peasants to present their case to the board in Queretaro, where exactly the same thing occurred.

The CNC union delegate in Guanajuato commented that, in general, not all complaints presented before the board are successful, because although it is clear that the dismissals are probably unjustifiable, when it comes time to present evidence they are told that the employers are right, since without a contract between two parties the complaints go nowhere.

Also, he added, they are prevented from presenting witnesses by the fact that the other workers do not appear out of fear that they will also lose their only income.

Independent of the fact that they have no job security, the farm administrators require them to work at night, on Sundays and holidays or whenever they wish

them to. They have no decent housing and they are totally lacking in medical service, so that when they do become ill they are dismissed as being unfit for work.

In Guanajuato, Quintana told us, there are between 8 and 10 groups that are organizing peasants unions, an action that has been well received by the workers, who clearly show that they are tired of enduring this unjust situation in which they live. Many of them are rapidly coming around and are responding energetically to the process of unionization; others, on being threatened by employers, abandon the organization and try to keep as far away as possible from those joining a union so that they will not be identified with them.

The threat of dismissal is the form of control that employers have to prevent workers from joining unions, but, despite this obstacle, there are now unions in Apaseo el Alto, Apaseo el Grande, Celaya, San Luis de la Paz and Dolores.

Another situation criticized by the peasants is the fact that COPLAMAR hires laborers for only 90 days and, when this contract expires, they are thanked and another group is contracted for 90 additional days. We do not know, commented the peasants, if this form of hiring people is just to keep them from acquiring rights and to keep them from demanding those rights.

Commenting on the incongruence of the fact that, on the one hand, the agricultural contractors complain of the lack of manpower, while on the other hand there are so many peasants out of work, the CNC delegate told us: "No peasant wants to leave his house to experience worse hunger and bad treatment. When the intermediaries come to the towns and farm settlements, they deceive the laborers by offering them wages and assistance that, in the end, they do not fulfill.

"Therefore, I say to that these men would prefer to take their chances by emigrating to the United States where they expect to earn a few dollars. 'If we have to starve to death here, it is better to try our luck in the city, where we will at least find something to eat,' they also say when they decide to come to Mexico City."

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BRIEFS

NON-AGGRESSION PACT--The National Peasant Confederation (CNC) signed a non-aggression pact with the rest of the organizations that operate in the countryside in order to put an end to violence and incursions, particularly in the state of Veracruz, where problems related to land have persistently caused deaths. The above was signed yesterday by the League of Agrarian Communities and Peasant Unions of the State of Veracruz, Florencio Azua Gallegos, who presented an activities report in Jalapa before the national director of the CNC, Victor Cervera Pacheco, and the governor of this locality, Agustin Acosta Lagunes. At this ceremony, the director from Veracruz asked for a revision of the guaranteed prices for basic products so that they might be adjusted to the real conditions that confront the farmer. Regarding this, Cervera Pacheco stated that the CNC will ask for a thorough revision not only of the guaranteed prices but also of the official structures that operate in the Mexican countryside. This revision is urgent so as not to waste infrastructural resources or human effort and to respond with facts. Cervera Pacheco announced that the CNC will create national organizations so that through them the necessary measures are taken for the peasants to have access to credit and equipment without having to personally make the transactions that in many cases represent an infinite amount of lost time. [Text] [Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 22 Dec 82 p 4-A] 9907

CANACINTRA: UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES--Toluca, Mexico--Some 6.8 million workers are unemployed in this country, Aurelio Tamez Garcia, vice president of the National Transformation Industry Chamber, said. He added that only 600,000 jobs will be created in 1983 by the public sector. He stated that inflation will reach 60 percent next year, thus industry will have to try to strengthen the condition of individual companies in order to survive. A lack of liquidity, he stressed, has prevented firms from working to full capacity because they need raw materials and repairs. The representative of industry in this country pointed out that the economic situation of the country is difficult, and a united effort is needed to overcome the crisis. [Text] [Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 16 Dec 82 p 16-A] 9015

JALISCO SHOE INDUSTRY UNEMPLOYMENT--Guadalajara, Jalisco--Some 17,000 shoe industry workers have been laid off so far this year as a result of the economic crisis that is affecting that sector, Fausto Rodriguez Romero, secretary general of the Shoe Workers Union, said. He explained that several shops and small factories that make shoes had disappeared, in addition, he stressed that the large shoe manufacturers have made personnel adjustments. Low shoe production, he explained, is due to a shortage of imported raw materials, which are impossible to acquire because of the lack of foreign exchange. He said that only 125 million pairs of shoes were produced in this state this year, compared to 250 million pairs in 1981. Rodriguez Romero said the majority of the factories had cut down working hours, to the detriment of the workers. [Text] [Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 15 Dec 82 p 8-D] 9015

CHIAPAS: CHAMULAS' WORK CONDITIONS-- San Juan Chamula, Chiapas, 14 Dec--About 15,000 Indians of this region were contracted to harvest coffee on the private plantations of Simojobel and Arriaga on the Pacific coast, by intermediaries, who collect from coffee plantation owners a minimum wage of 180 to 190 pesos a day and give the natives only 100 to 120 pesos for a 12-hour day, reported Jose Antonio Perez from the National Coordinating Group for the Plan of Ayala. In addition, the Indians involved in harvesting this seed are treated subhumanly and, for the period of the work, they live in large sheds where as many as 20 families "are accommodated" in 40 square meters. As was observed, the transportation of the natives to the coffee plantations is very bad; they use suburban buses that leave for the work sites from San Cristobal Las Casas, with as many as 130 persons per unit. Antonio Perez added that unemployment, the lack of handicraft workshops and the ravaging of community lands in the indigenous regions of Chiapas are the fundamental reasons why the Chamulas are contracted for these harvests, despite the precarious work conditions and great exploitation to which they are subjected. [Text] [Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 15 Dec 82 p 2] 9746

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